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This dissertation will take a theoretical approach to analyzing certain challenges in the
design of intellectual property rights (‘IPR’) policy. The first essay looks the advisabil-
ity of introducing IPR into a market which is currently only very lightly protected - the
US fashion industry. The proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Preven-
tion Act is intended to introduce EU standards into the US. Using a sequential, 2-firm,
vertical differentiation framework, I analyze the effects of protection on investment in
innovative designs by high-quality (‘designer’) and lower-quality (‘mass-market’) firms
when the mass-marketer may opt to imitate, consumers prefer trendsetting designs
and firms compete in prices. I show that design protection, by transforming mass-
marketers from imitators to innovators, may reduce both designer profits and welfare.
The model provides possible explanations for the dearth of EU case law and the in-
crease in designer/mass-marketer collaborations. The second essay contributes to the
literature on patent design and fee shifting, contrasting the effects of the American (or
‘each party pays’) rule and English (or ‘losing party pays’) rule of legal cost allocation
on optimal patent breadth when innovation is sequential and firms are differentiated
duopolists. I show that if litigation spending is endogenous, the American rule may
induce broader patents and a higher probability of infringement than the English rule
if R&D costs are sufficiently low. If, however, R&D costs are moderate, the ranking is
reversed and it is the English rule that leads to broader patents. Neither rule supports
lower patent breadth than the other over the entire parameter space. As such, any
attempts to reform the US patent system by narrowing patents must carefully weigh
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the impact on firms’ legal spending decisions if policymakers do not wish to adversely
affect investment incentives. The third and final essay analyzes the effects of corporate
structure on licensing behaviour. Policymakers and legal scholars are concerned about
the potential for an Anticommons, an underuse of early stage research tools to produce
complex final products, typically arising from either blocking or stacking. I use a sim-
ple, one-period differentiated duopoly model to show that if patentees have flexibility
in corporate structure, Anticommons problems are greatly reduced. The model sug-
gests that if the patentee owns the single (or single set) of essential IPR and goods are
of symmetric quality, Anticommons issues may be entirely eliminated, as the patentee
will always license, simply shifting its corporate structure depending on the identity of
the downstream competitor. If the rival produces a more valuable good, Anticommons
problems are reduced. Further, if the patentee holds 1 of 2 essential patents, the ability
to shift its corporate structure may reduce total licensing costs to rival firms. However
the analysis offers a cautionary note: while spin-offs by the patentee help to sustain
downstream competition, they may restrict market output, and therefore welfare. Thus
the inefficiency in the patent system may be in the opposite direction than is currently
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A well-crafted Intellectual Property Rights (‘IPR’) policy framework is an essential
pre-requisite for ongoing innovation. In this regard, policymakers must achieve a fine
balance, in that the IPR system must be simultaneously sufficiently robust to incentivize
early innovation and sufficiently limited to allow for entry of later generation products.
Further, the policies will generally be applicable across the entire economy, so that
particular industries may be affected by the IPR system to differing extents. This
dissertation will take a theoretical approach to analyzing certain challenges in designing
intellectual rights policy in two key areas.
The first area relates to fashion design, a low-IPR, trend-driven industry. In the
US, apparel designs (as distinct from logos or trade dress) receive virtually no protec-
tion and copying is rampant; in contrast, European fashion designs have been granted
strong protection, yet copying is still rampant. And in both contexts, design innova-
tion proceeds apace. Which of these systems is better for design innovation? At the
current time, there is significant lobbying by high-end labels, via the Council of Fashion
Designers of America (CFDA), the major trade association, for protection to be put in
place in the US. The latest of repeated attempts at a legislative solution is embodied
in the proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention Act (‘IDPPPA’),
which is intended to bring fashion design IPR in line with the system currently existing
in the EU. What can theory say about the advisability of such a policy?
In the first essay, I use a simple, one-period, 2-firm, vertical differentiation framework
to analyze the interaction of design imitation, consumer taste for trendsetting apparel
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and the potential effects of design protection. The model suggests that in the absence
of design protection, a low-quality firm will imitate (or knockoff) a designer firm if the
cost savings associated with imitation are sufficiently high and the knockoff is perceived
sufficiently well. Imitation has both positive and negative effects: on the one hand, if
mass-marketers imitate they do not design novel collections; this leaves the designer
as the single novel firm - the trendsetter. On the other hand, imitation allows the
mass-marketer to cut into designer profits. The main result is that a design protection
system may actually underperform the status quo, leaving both high-end and mass-
market firms worse off and welfare lower relative to a no protection regime.
The intuition is that if consumers value both design novelty and quality independently
(that is, are willing to pay more for a novel design than for an older one, for any brand)
and imitation is suppressed, the mass-market firms face a stark choice: fall behind in
trends as well as quality and cede more of the market or spend more to hire in designers
and produce novel collections. Under appropriate conditions, this landscape may turn
would be imitators into design innovators, stronger competitors to the high-quality,
high-cost designers. The model suggests that if the only effect of the design right is
to allow for protection from knockoffs, designer firms may do better not to utilize the
protection system at all, sanctioning imitation. However, if the design right enhances
the popularity of either the brand or the current collection sufficiently, perhaps if it acts
as a certification of fashion status, then the design rights system produces a Prisoners’
Dilemma in protection: all types of firms will pursue this valuable asset. The result
is that firms find themselves locked in a design arms race: each attempts to introduce
trendsetting designs, with the result that the competing designs effectively cancel each
other out in the market. The model suggests that the welfare enhancing policy is not
to allow design protection, as the system may have negative implications for firms and
consumers relative to the no protection case. I show that for certain model parameters
licensing may provide a means to end the arms race, though even in this outcome
designer payoffs may not compare favourably with the no protection regime.
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The second area of analysis is highly sequential, IPR active industries, best illustrated
by biotechnology. In these industries, research and development (‘R&D’) inputs, often
termed research tools, are virtually impossible to invent around and it is extremely
unlikely that any commercial application can be developed without substantial use of
the prior inventions. The importance of these research tools means that firms in such
sectors tend to patent much more frequently than in other industries. This phenomenon
then raises several concerns about the impact of patent assertion and licensing failure
on future innovation. High profile court cases have served to reinforce these fears, and
has lead to charges by many that US patents are too broad, giving too much power to
the early innovators. But attempts to reform the system must consider all the issues
that complicate firms’ IPR strategies, including R&D spending, licensing and litigation.
I focus on two critical factors, the legal cost shifting regime and corporate structuring.
The second essay looks at the effects of legal fee-shifting rules on patent breadth
when innovation is sequential, legal costs are endogenous and firms compete in prices.
Patent breadth refers to how different a product has to be from the protected one
in order to be found infringing. Low breadth (that is, narrowness) means that even
quite similar products will generally be held not to infringe. Narrow patents therefore
leave more space for new products to be developed. Optimal choice of breadth is
complicated by the fact that enforcing protection of the patent asset is costly, with
costs impacting firm behaviour. Further, the costs of litigating patents are substantial:
in the US, direct legal fees alone are estimated at between US$1 and 3 million to each
party (American Intellectual Property Law Association 2001 figures) while indirect
costs, including business losses due to increased perception of risk, are even higher.
This implies that the ability to shift fees is of increasing importance for firms and, by
extension, for policy.
However, to date, theoretical models of fee-shifting have tended to assume away
policymakers’ reactions to legal costs. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap, linking
the effects of fee shifting on firms and regulators. Using a simple differentiated duopoly
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model based on Singh and Vives (1984), I contrast the American rule (where each party
pays its own litigation costs, regardless of judgement) and the English rule (where the
losing party pays all litigation costs) on patent breadth. Consistent with much of
the literature, I show that the English rule induces more overall spending than the
American rule. Interestingly, this is largely due to greater spending by patentee firms
when goods are sufficiently similar. But this does not necessarily induce a higher
overall probability of receiving a successful judgement. Instead I find that, all else
equal, the American rule allows for broader patents than the English rule only if R&D
costs are sufficiently low. The intuition is that firms under the English rule must
explicitly consider spending by the rival when deciding how much to spend on litigation
themselves; this can induce a legal arms race, leading to an explosion in spending costs.
The Patent Office therefore sets narrow patents, encouraging the Courts to focus rulings
only on the closeness of patented and allegedly infringing goods. If, however, R&D
costs are moderate, the ranking is reversed and it is the English rule that leads to
broader patents, as the Patent Office prefers to set maximally broad patents under the
English rule. The intuition is that because under the American rule firms consider
only their own spending, investment incentives remain strong even with high costs,
but under the English rule, the patentee will only have an incentive to invest if the
rival cannot externalize its litigation costs onto that firm. Neither rule supports lower
patent breadth than the other over the entire parameter space. Thus, from first level
observation the American system may sometimes appear to be more pro-patentee, but
this does not necessarily prejudice later-stage innovation; neither is it necessarily due
to any inherent bias or failing at the Patent Office. It may simply reflect the features
of the cost allocation system.
The third essay looks at the effect of patentee corporate structure on technology
licensing. There is some concern that the numerous extant patents in highly sequential
industries could produce what is termed a ‘tragedy of the Anticommons’: new products
may fail to come to market because firms cannot co-ordinate with the multiple owners
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of the necessary research tools. This is typically a result of blocking problems, stacking
problems, or both. But the incentive to license - and thus likelihood of any Anticom-
mons - differs substantially if patentees compete in the product markets. And where
they do, policymakers must also consider that such companies may elect to spin-off IPR
units in an effort to maximize profits. This ability to vertically separate, which allows
the patentee to commit to charging downstream entities uniform license royalties, may
significantly affect the extent to which later-stage innovators are kept out of the market.
Again using the baseline Singh and Vives (1984) model, I show that if patentees have
flexibility in corporate structure, Anticommons problems are greatly reduced. Indeed,
the model suggests that if the patentee owns the single (or single set) of essential IPR
and products are of symmetric quality, Anticommons issues may be entirely eliminated.
The patentee will always license, simply shifting its corporate structure depending on
the identity of the downstream competitor. If the rival produces a higher quality good,
Anticommons problems may be reduced. And if the patentee holds 1 of 2 essential
patents, the ability to shift its corporate structure may reduce total licensing costs to
rival firms. Thus if US policymakers are concerned about reducing the likelihood of
Anticommons problems, then making spinoffs less costly, by for example increasing the
allowed purposes for which such distributions currently receive non-tax status, will go
some way to overcoming this problem. However the analysis offers a cautionary note:
while spin-offs by the patentee help to sustain downstream competition, they may
restrict market output and therefore welfare. Thus the true inefficiency in the patent
system may be in the opposite direction than is currently thought - there may be too
much technology transfer, rather than too little. And given that such divestitures,
unlike mergers, do not normally require permission from competition authorities, such
potentially welfare reducing effects may be difficult to avoid.
Taken as a whole, this body of work is intended to illustrate some of the complexities
involved in crafting IPR policy. The models are highly stylized and include certain
arguably restrictive assumptions, and for these reasons applicability of the results is
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limited. I nevertheless feel that the models illustrate some potentially important un-
intended consequences of policy actions and therefore provide some useful caveats for
policymakers.
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2. Cutting Too Close? Design Protection
and Innovation in Fashion Goods
Abstract
Lobbying by high-end, American designers for intellectual property-type fashion
design protection has culminated in the proposed Innovative Design Protection
and Piracy Prevention Act, intended to introduce EU standards. Using a sequen-
tial, 2-firm, vertical differentiation framework, I analyze the effects of protection
on investment in innovative designs by high-quality (‘designer’) and lower-quality
(‘mass-market’) firms when the mass-marketer may opt to imitate, consumers pre-
fer trendsetting designs and firms compete in prices. I show that design protection,
by transforming mass-marketers from imitators to innovators, may reduce both de-
signer profits and welfare. The model provides possible explanations for the dearth
of EU case law and the increase in designer/mass-marketer collaborations.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Fashion Design Protection, Imitation, Li-
censing
JEL Classifications: D21, L13, O31, O34
0A version of this chapter was presented at the CESifo Conference on Law and Economics 2011 and
is published as CESifo Working Paper No.3716 (January 2012). Financial support from CESifo for
attendance at the Conference on Law and Economics is gratefully acknowledged.
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To refrain from imitation is the best revenge.
- Marcus Aurelius
2.1. Introduction
It is often argued that a strong intellectual property (‘IP’) framework is a prerequisite
for attracting ongoing investment, as firms only invest where they can be relatively
certain of appropriating the returns to such investment. Indeed, this is the argument
most often deployed in defense of the high levels of patenting in industries such as
biotechnology and software. But this line of reasoning fails to explain the fact that
some industries which attract considerable investment do not rely on IP protection to
any significant degree. These ‘low-IP’ industries are perhaps best represented by the
US fashion industry, where fashion designs themselves are only very lightly protected
and copying is rampant yet economic activity continues apace.
However the Council of Fashion Designers of America (CFDA), the trade association
of high-end US designers, has lobbied for legislative attention, claiming that returns to
investment are eroded by copying. The latest of the repeated attempts at a legislative
solution is embodied in the proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Preven-
tion Act (‘IDPPPA’), introduced into the US House of Representatives by Rep. Robert
Goodlatte in July 2011.1 This is intended to bring US fashion design IP into line with
the system currently existing in the EU.
In this paper, I use a simple, 2-firm, vertical differentiation framework to analyze
the interaction of design imitation, consumer taste for trendsetting apparel and the
potential effects of design protection. In the absence of design protection, a low-quality
1Previous versions of similar legislation, collectively termed the Design Piracy Bills, were found in (i)
House Bill 5055 of the 109th Congress (failed to advance in December 2006); (ii) House Bill 2033
and its Senate counterpart, Senate Bill 1957, introduced in the 110th Congress in April and August
2007, respectively; and (iii) House Bill 2196 and its Senate counterpart, Senate Bill 3728, introduced
in April and August 2010, respectively. The current bill under consideration, House Bill 2511, is
unchanged from the Bills introduced into the 111th Congress in 2010. A Preliminary hearing on
the proposed Act took place on July 15, 2011 before the US House Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property, Competition and the Internet.
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mass-market firm will imitate or knockoff 2 the designer if the cost savings associated
with imitation are sufficiently high and the knockoff is perceived sufficiently well. Imita-
tion has both positive and negative effects: on the one hand, if mass-marketers imitate
they do not design novel collections; this leaves the designer as the single novel firm
- the trendsetter. On the other hand, imitation allows the mass-marketer to cut into
designer profits. The main result of the paper is that a design protection system may
underperform the status quo, leaving both high-end and mass-market firms worse off
and welfare lower relative to a no protection regime.
The intuition is that if imitation is suppressed, the mass-market firm faces a stark
choice: fall behind in trend as well as quality and cede more of the market or spend
more to hire in designers and produce novel collections. Under appropriate conditions,
this landscape turns would be imitators into design innovators, stronger competitors
to the high-quality, high-cost designers. The introduction of design protection may
therefore have counter-intuitive effects. The model suggests that if the only effect of
the design right is to allow for protection from knockoffs, designer firms may do better
not to utilize the protection system at all, effectively sanctioning imitation. However,
if the design right enhances the popularity of either the brand or the current collection
sufficiently, both firms pursue this valuable asset and find themselves locked in a design
arms race: each attempts to introduce trendsetting designs, with the result that the
competing designs effectively cancel each other out in the market. I show that for
certain model parameters licensing may provide a means to end the arms race, though
even in this outcome the designer firm’s payoff may not compare favourably with what
it would earn if no design protection were available.
The model provides an alternative explanation for observed trends in the fashion
industry, namely the lack of case law observed in Europe despite strong protection
and the increase in designer/mass-marketer co-branded collections (so-called ‘diffusion
lines’). The model also suggests that, given that design protection results in a Prisoners’
2I interpret knockoff copying in line with Barnett et al. (2008): “ ‘mass-market’ firms supply close
imitations of successful originals to the broad middle of the market demand curve under different
brand names and at various quality grades”.
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Dilemma if the returns to design right ownership are sufficiently high, it may be better
for the fashion industry and for consumer welfare if the IDPPPA were not adopted.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2.2, I briefly overview the
legal framework for design protection in the EU and the proposed US measures. In
Section 2.3, I provide a short discussion of the most related work in the economic and
legal literature. In Section 2.4, I introduce the model setup. In Section 2.5, I solve the
specification with exogenous qualities (reserving the discussion of endogenous quality
for Appendix B). Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2. Legal Protection of Fashion Designs
The proposed IDPPPA was crafted after careful consideration of the recently amended
European framework for design protection. I thus begin with brief overview of the
current protection system in Europe.
2.2.1. Design Protection in Europe
The European Community Design Protection Regulation (‘DPR’) went into effect in all
member states in March 2002. The DPR establishes 2 mechanisms for protection: (i)
the unregistered community design (‘UCD’), which applies from first disclosure of the
design in the Community, including showing at trade fairs or in advertisements, and
is valid for 3 years; and (ii) the registered community design (‘RCD’), which requires
filing of documents with the Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (‘OHIM’)
and is valid for 5 years. The RCD is renewable up to an additional 4 times, meaning
protection is available for a maximum of 25 years. These instruments have simultaneous
effect across the 27 EU member countries.
There is no limit to the number of designs per application and there is a 1-year grace
period in establishing novelty of the design, so that a designer can ‘test the market’ for
up to a year (with rights under the UCD) before seeking the stronger protection of the
RCD. There are 3 requirements for design protection, namely (i) novelty (no identical
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design must have been disseminated previously); (ii) individual character (the item’s
impression on the buying public must be distinct from that made by any previous
design); and (iii) inoffensiveness (the design should not constitute an offence against
public morality).
Somewhat surprisingly, in spite of the seemingly strong rights granted there has
not been much case law relating to designs since the establishment of this framework.
Legal scholars have offered various explanations for the lack of judicial decisions relating
to the framework, including inter alia, that (a) standards of eligibility are somewhat
low (novelty requires only that no identical design has been available) so that any
attempt at meaningful protection standards may change this outcome; (b) infringement
suits are initiated but parties regularly reach confidential settlements before trial, with
settlements reported only in the most egregious cases (such as when luxury brand
Chloé received around GBP12,000 from Topshop, which was ruled to have plagiarized
its dungaree dress3); and (c) in general, agents in the EU are somewhat less litigious
than in the US, so that cases are less frequent than might be expected under a similar
set of rules in the US.
This lack of case law is, however, consistent with the results of this model. I predict
that if the only effect of protection is to prevent knockoffs, then designers may do
better not to utilize the system at all. The design rights framework would remain
under-utilized as fashion leaders choose to let imitation continue, in spite of the fact
that such imitation partially erodes any novelty lead. Conversely, if protection carries
sufficient additional benefits for firms, I predict that designers will do best not to litigate
but to license to would-be infringers. In either case, filings would be minimal.
2.2.2. Current and Proposed Protection in the US
As the current time, fashion design is largely outside of the realm of US IP law, as
current IP categories allow for only a small portion of design elements to be protected.
3Emil Dugan, ‘Topshop Ordered to Destroy Dresses Copied from Chloé Design’, The Independent,
July 27, 2007.
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Thus, fashion design is often said to fall into IP’s ‘negative space’4: Design Patents
only protect “new, original and ornamental design for an article or manufacture”5, but
novelty and non-obviousness criteria are hard to satisfy for apparel and the approval
process is lengthy; Copyright covers only “original works of authorship” and does not
extend to items which have an “intrinsic utilitarian function”6; and Trademark and
Trade Dress preserve only distinguishing words and symbols/devices used by an indi-
vidual or a firm to identify its product but provides no protection to elements of the
design itself.
The proposed IDPPPA is intended to fill this gap, suppressing ‘knockoff’ copying.
This protection may be also be deployed between designers, blocking so called ‘homage’
or inspiration collections. Indeed, while imitation of high-end collections by mass mar-
ket firms undoubtedly attracts more attention, designer produced homages - effectively
high quality knockoffs of past designs by fellow high-end houses - are not insignificant.
Notable examples include Ralph Lauren’s replication of Yves Saint Laurent’s classic
black tuxedo dress7 and the use of Rick Owens designs as ‘inspiration’ by both Helmut
Lang and Alexander Wang.8
A Summary of the Proposed Innovative Design Protection and Piracy Prevention
Act (IDPPPA) The proposed Act would extend the existing protection mechanism for
vessel hull designs to fashion designs, with a fashion design described as “the appearance
as a whole of an article of apparel, including its ornamentation”9. Apparel, specifically,
is defined as:
“(A) an article of men’s, women’s, or children’s clothing, including undergarments,
4This discussion is based on Spevacek (2009), which provides a more detailed analysis of the challenges
for design protection in current IP categories.
535 U.S.C. §171 (2006)
6Ibid. §101
7The suit over the dress, first created by Mr. Saint Laurent in 1966, was filed in Paris in 1994 by
Yves Saint Laurent. The Tribunal de Commerce awarded Yves Saint Laurent USD395,090 for
“counterfeiting and disloyal competition”. See Amy M. Spindler, ‘A Ruling by French Court Finds
Copyright in a Design’, The New York Times, May 19, 1994.
8Ruth La Ferla, ‘Imitate that Zipper!’, The New York Times, September 02, 2009.
9Text of S 3728, 111th Congress (2010), Section 2(a)(7)
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outerwear, gloves, footwear, and headgear;
(B) handbags, purses, wallets, duffel bags, suitcases, tote bags and belts; and
(C) eyeglass frames.”10
Rights would be analogous to those provided under the European UCD, in that they
would be valid for up to 3 years with no registration required. Instead, a designer
can claim protection of an eligible design simply by marking the apparel as protected
(tagging the item with the words ‘protected design’ or a to-be-approved symbol).11
However, knowingly marking an ineligible design as protected would also carry penal-
ties.
In theory, eligibility requires “a unique, distinguishable, non-trivial and non-utilitarian
variation over prior designs”12 and designs would be protected only from knockoffs
which are “so similar in appearance as to be likely mistaken for the protected de-
sign”13, though there is a real question as to how Courts will go about interpreting
the unique and non-trivial criteria. Further, as currently laid out, the Act requires
plaintiffs to show that the design meets all the criteria for protection and that it was
available for sufficient time and in sufficient locations that the alleged infringer could
not reasonably claim to be unaware of its existence.
2.3. Related Literature
The status concerns and psychological motivations surrounding consumption of fashion
goods have long been studied in economics, from the seminal works of Veblen (1899)
and Leibenstein (1950). However the literature has focused on explaining fashion cycles
and on the welfare and public policy impact of the associated consumption externalities,
with less attention to the question of imitation. Coelho and McClure (1993) incorporate
10Ibid., Section 2(a)(9)
11According to the most recent version of the proposed legislation, if designs are not marked it would
be more difficult for a designer to seek relief, as written notice of the design protection would have




status effects into the standard monopoly model and show that if consumers consider
future as well as current period output by the firm, pricing behavior may be cyclical
even with downward sloping demand. Pesendorfer (1995) models demand for fashion
goods as driven by the desire to signal status in a matching game. Fashion cycles are
driven by the fact that the composition of ‘in’ and ‘out’ groups change over time, so
that the monopoly designer has the incentive to periodically make new signals. Frijters
(1998) takes a similar approach in that fashion goods are used to signal status though
here the status associated with the good is the average social standing of those also
consuming the good. Again firms have the incentive to periodically create new designs
as old ones lose signalling value. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) and Corneo and Jeanne
(1997) also focus on the use of fashion goods as signals of status.
While imitation of fashion designs has to date been less well investigated, three recent
works address that question. Caulkins et al. (2007) uses an optimal control model to
analyze choices by a fashion leader firm facing multiple imitators in a one-dimensional
product space and shows that, depending on the level of design cost, it may be optimal
for the leader to never innovate, to innovate once or to constantly innovate, cycling so
as to stay ahead of imitators. Jorgensen and Di Liddo (2007) uses a 2 period discrete
time model to analyze optimal timing of entry by designers into mid-range markets
in response to imitation, modelling the high-end and mid-class segments as separate
markets, in which demand depends on brand power. Bekir et al. (2010) looks at the
related issue of when luxury designers act to drive counterfeiters out of production,
concluding that luxury providers will not act to completely remove counterfeiters as
these firms may increase profits to luxury designers if designers are able to appropriate
revenues from the infringing counterfeiting and the presence of counterfeiters induces
snob effects.
However, without exception these models assume that fashion is driven by designer
products and that imitators have no ability to transform themselves into branded com-
petitors who then influence design. Inclusion of both the expanded strategic choice
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for mass-marketers and the design protection question distinguishes the current work.
We believe the ability of mass-marketers to influence trends is realistic, as the rising
influence of street-wear and urban fashion on pop culture has fuelled growth of lower
quality, high-volume brand families, certain of which now rival high-end operators in
both asset base and supply chain dominance.14 This is having a knock-on effect on the
products of high-end designers themselves, which would suggest that rather than solely
making trends designers may also be refining and reflecting them.
This paper is also related to the literature on product differentiation with consump-
tion externalities. Recent papers focus on horizontally related industries with network
effects (Ghazzai and Lahmandi-Ayed (2009), Baake and Boom (2001)) and snob effects
(Grilo et al. (2001)). Consumption externalities in vertical differentiation has been
taken up in Lambertini and Orsini (2002), (2005) which analyze welfare and regulation
in monopoly and duopoly cases, respectively. However they analyze the implications of
the status effect on firm qualities and profits and on taxation policy, while this paper
attempts to analyze the interaction of taste for novelty, imitation and IP policy.
The ongoing legislative attempts at design protection have also inspired a large legal
literature on fashion goods and IP policy, with several recent papers focusing squarely
on the potential effects of the proposed IDPPPA (Hedrick (2007), Preet (2008), Spe-
vacek (2009), Beltrametti (2010)) though the opposing viewpoints are perhaps best
summarized by, on the one hand, the arguments in Hemphill and Suk (2009a), (2009b)
that rampant copying is impeding innovation in fashion and that greater IP protection
should be applied, and on the other, by the arguments in Raustiala and Sprigman
(2006), (2009) that IP protection will harm fashion firms, as imitation boosts profits
by establishing anchors (the set of current designs representing what is ‘in fashion’)
and helping to speed up the fashion cycle by diffusing trends.
14One clear example is Swedish retailer H&M Hennes & Mauritz AB; in fiscal 2010, the H&M group
earned operating profit of SEK 24.7BN, equivalent to approx USD 3.5BN; this compares well to
the operating performance of the entire Fashion and Leather Goods division of LVMH, a stable




I explore a sequential game in which two vertically differentiated, single product ap-
parel firms compete in prices in the market. The vertical differentiation model seems
most appropriate for the analysis of fashion firms, as the industry lends itself to broad
ordering of preferences on both objective (quality of fabric and ornamentation) and
subjective (branding) grounds, with this ordering reinforced by heavy advertising and
editorial coverage. The high quality firm (the ‘designer’ firm, denoted D) faces a lower
quality firm (the ‘mass marketer’, denoted M) which can choose to imitate the design
produced by the high-end firm (to knockoff ), to produce its own mainstream design (I
also term this an ‘ordinary’ design) or to produce its own novel design (to differentiate)
each season.
I do not focus on explaining the length or persistence of fashion cycles in this effort,
simply assuming instead that each firm introduces a new product, which may or may not
consist of a novel design, each season.15 This seems a realistic description, as individual
designers do largely conform themselves to the relatively rigid industry calendar in
respect of introduction of designs (runway shows) and delivery of new collections into
stores, and as not every season is characterized by novelty in fashion designs (with some
seasons’ designs heavily inspired by the past).
Design protection allows right-holders the legal means to preclude sale of, or to
appropriate revenues earned from, any design approximating the protected one. Such
rights may also provide additional benefits to the firm over and above the protection of
the current season design. Ownership of such assets may positively influence consumer
perception of the brand, marking the firm as a true seasonal trendsetter, or of the
design itself, certifying the collection as a focal collection for the period. In this sense,
ownership of the design right makes the product more attractive. Any firm, independent
of quality, may thus gain from protecting a novel design. Design rights would reach not
simply knockoffs but also potentially any future ‘homage’ designs and would apply to all
15The single product may also be referred to by the fashion industry term collection. I will use the
term collection and design interchangeably.
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classes of rivals. Protection is costless and any protection decision is observable. Only
novel designs may receive protection, implying that novelty is observable to the Courts.
This rules out any attempt by a mass-marketer to seek protection for a knockoff.
2.4.1. Firms
I consider a duopoly with the designer offering a quality sd and the mass-marketer
offering quality sm, with sd > sm > 0. Each firm seeks to maximize profits, πi =
(pi − ci)qi − Fi, where pi refers to the price, qi to the output and ci to the marginal
cost of firm i.
Marginal cost of production is increasing in quality, taking the form ci =
s2i
2 to reflect
the more luxurious fabric, ornamentation and/or more labour intensive production
costs associated with high end apparel.
Firms also face fixed costs of apparel production each season, representing the over-
heads associated with each collection (inter alia, design and/or sketching time and
sample production). Fixed costs are denoted by Fi. Mainstream or ordinary designs,
defined as those which rely on past influences and do not themselves constitute an
artistic advance in fashion, have no novelty and have F oi = 0. Novel designs are associ-
ated with higher costs, Fni > 0, as producing a novel collection requires that designers
conduct more research to ensure the relevant design elements do indeed comprise a
non-trivial design advance. Thus, in selecting a design strategy the firm also selects a
fixed cost level.
As the mass-market firm moves second, it faces a novelty cost disadvantage - in
producing a novel design it must ensure that it invents around all existing designs,




I am interested in exploring the potential effects of design protection on firms’ design
innovation and as such restrict attention to cases where firms can feasibly opt in or
out of producing a novel collection. I therefore consider fixed costs of producing novel
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collections which are strictly positive but low enough that the profit earned by the low
quality firm is non-negative even if the firm does not maintain a novelty lead.16
Assumption 2.1 Fixed costs are strictly positive but sufficiently low that a mass-
market firm may feasibly produce a novel collection even in the absence of a novelty





where πnlm refers to M’s profit if neither or both firms produce novel, protected collections
(and therefore no novelty or protection lead applies).
Imitation by Mass-market Firms
Producing a knockoff allows M to mimic the look (but not the branding) of D’s collec-
tion. If M chooses to knockoff, it is able to avoid some of the season-specific fixed costs
associated with producing an original collection (for example, it can save by hiring a
smaller or lower-quality design team, or by reducing design time as it simply reverse-
engineers D’s patterns). This is reflected in F imm = κF
n
m. In what follows, I set κ = 0,
so that producing a knockoff collection incurs the same (zero) fixed cost as producing
a mainstream collection.
2.4.2. Consumers
Consumers are heterogeneous in the marginal willingness to pay for quality, θ, dis-
tributed uniformly on [θ, θ̄] where θ = (θ̄ − 1) and θ̄ > 1. The mass of consumers is
normalized to 1. Each consumer has a unit demand for fashion goods each period and
buys from either of the firms. Formally,
Assumption 2.2 Throughout, θ̄ is restricted such that there is full market coverage.
This assumption simplifies the exposition.
A trend is set if there is a single novel design in the current selling period (season).
Consumers have a preference for trendsetting (or novelty-leading) apparel, reflected
16An alternative interpretation would be that I confine attention to large firms, for which the cost of
hiring a design team is a small percentage of earnings.
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in the increased utility associated with such a product. This is consistent with a Pe-
sendorfer (1995) interpretation that owning a trendsetting design in the relevant period
allows a customer to signal higher status (in this case, to signal herself a ‘fashionista’).
The trendsetting status of a design in a season is judged relative to the rival firm: a
collection is perceived as novelty-leading if and only if the rival has not also produced
a novel collection. If neither firm produces a novel design, the firms compete only on
quality, as in the standard vertical differentiation framework. Similarly, if both firms
produce a novel design, then the entire consumer population has access to new designs;
there is no novelty leader which may confer status. In this case, the effective distance
between the firms’ products is again reduced to the quality differential.
Consumers buying from firm i enjoy a net surplus of Ui = θsi + nn + λnipr − pi,
where si denotes the quality of firm i, alternatively construed as its brand or location
in product space; nn ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function representing a design novelty lead
(or trend lead) over a trailing rival, with nn = 0 if neither (both) firm(s) is (are) novel;
and nipr ∈ {0, 1} is an indicator function representing a protection lead over a trailing
rival, with nipr = 0 if neither firm protects or both firms protect a novel design. Thus,
if firm i has produced a novel design and firm j has not, consumers buying from firm i
enjoy a net surplus equal to Ui and consumers buying from firm j enjoy a net surplus
equal to Uj where:
Ui =

θsi + 1 + λ− pi if firm i has protected the novel design,
θsi + 1− pi if firm i has not protected the novel design,
Uj =

θsj + (1− γ)− pj if firm j knocks off i’s novel design,
θsj − pj if firm j produces a mainstream design,
The effects of design novelty and protection are additive in the utility function,
reflecting the underlying assumption that consumers’ enjoyment of novel, protected
designs is independent of the firm’s quality: whether the brand that produces the
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trendy, focal item for the season is a designer such as Gucci or a mass-marketer such
as Topshop, its customers’ willingness to pay increases.
Knockoffs allow mass-market consumers to participate in the status-conferring trend
by displaying a lesser version of the novel item and, for this reason, provide increased
utility relative to a mainstream mass-market design. The parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) reflects
the perceived distance between the original design and a knockoff. It is the same for
all consumers. If there is imitation, the novelty lead associated with producing an
innovative collection reduces to 1− (1−γ) = γ, which is less than the lead enjoyed by a
non-imitated designer (equal to 1). If γ is close to zero, the knockoff is viewed as almost
identical to the high quality good in appearance (though there is still an obvious quality
difference reflected in si) and any novelty advantage held by the designer is almost fully
eroded. Conversely, if γ is close to 1, the knockoff is so poor a reproduction of the
original design that the designer enjoys almost the full extent of the novelty gap.
The parameter λ ≥ 0 reflects the consumer perception of the ownership of design
rights for a trendsetting design. It is the same for all consumers. This is associated
with the ‘focality’ of the design.17 The design that sparks a trend serves as a focal
point for the season, as it will, for example, be heavily publicized as the ‘splurge’ half
of any ‘splurge vs. steal’ magazine editorials. Ownership of the design right serves to
certify the firm’s ownership of the focal design and thus increases the desirability of
the brand that produces such focal designs. This effect is independent of quality. I
therefore interpret λ = 0 to mean that consumers value only novelty; creation of novel
designs does not add to the allure of the producer. However if λ > 0, consumers value
novelty and derive increased utility from owning an original from the it brand, the
producer of the season’s focal design.
2.4.3. Welfare
If both firms enjoy positive demand and the marginal consumer (the consumer indiffer-
ent between buying the high-end and the mass-market good) has a marginal utility of
17I thank Ed Hopkins for suggesting this interpretation.
20









W = CS + πd + πm (2.2)
2.4.4. The Courts and Design Protection
Availability of design protection is announced to the firms at the start of the game.
Design protection is perfect and if M imitates, it is required to transfer to the designer
all revenue earned from sale of the knockoffs as damages.
2.4.5. Timing
The game proceeds in four steps. Period 0, the pre-season, and period 1, the selling
period or season, are each divided into 2 sub-periods:
• Period 0.1: the designer chooses quality, decides if to produce a mainstream design
or novel design and, if it elects novelty, whether or not to protect the design. At
the end of this subperiod, the designer presents its collection (the range of apparel
items based on its design) to the public: the real-world analogy is that D puts on
a runway show.
• Period 0.2: the mass market firm chooses quality and decides whether to knockoff
the designer firm, market its own mainstream design or its own novel design and,
if it chooses to be novel, whether or not to protect the design.
• Period 1.1: the firms deliver designs to the market and compete in prices.
• Period 1.2: any cases of infringement are litigated in Court.
This timing captures the reality that while high-end designers show collections months
in advance of the relevant season, typically mass market firms do not. These firms in-
stead produce their collections later, and therefore have the opportunity to knockoff
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Figure 2.1.: Sequence of the game
designer efforts. As such, knockoffs may reach the market at the same time as originals.
The order of moves in the game is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The structure of the game is common knowledge and there is complete information.
2.5. The Model with Exogenous Quality
I proceed with the additional assumption that firm quality is exogenously given.
This setup of interest for two reasons: firstly, I believe this framework best encap-
sulates the challenge for existing fashion firms when considering whether to protect
designs for a particular selling season. The fashion industry is characterized by heavy
investment in establishing and re-enforcing firms’ market positions, with the aim of
fixing the firm’s brand in the minds of consumers. As such, product quality may be
viewed as effectively fixed on a season to season basis for existing firms.
Secondly, the market sees high-end designers facing competition and threats of imi-
tation from competitors right across the quality spectrum: from the value segment of
the market (low end, high volume operators such as Forever 21 and Primark as well
as the higher quality fast fashion firms such as Zara and H&M), from the mid-priced
segment (including aspirational brands, such as Banana Republic, Ann Taylor and
Whistles) and even from the premium segment (other designers, both small, indepen-
dent design houses as well as respected rival high-end brands) and it is of interest to
explore the effects of protection for competition between the designer and various types
of mass-marketer.
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I therefore normalize firm qualities sd and sm to 1 and β, respectively, with 0 < β <
1.18
2.5.1. The no protection regime
First consider the case reflecting the status quo in the US: assume no protection for
fashion design is available. At stage 0.2, M must decide if to produce a mainstream
collection, knockoff or produce a novel collection. If D has produced a mainstream
collection, M may choose to produce a novel collection and take the novelty lead.
The effect of such a lead is to make M’s product more attractive to consumers. The
assumption on fixed costs means that novelty is always feasible, thus if M can take such
a lead, it always chooses to do so.
If taking a lead is not possible (that is, if D has produced a novel design) then
M must decide between maintaining and closing the novelty gap. If it produces a
mainstream collection and trails in design, its product is less attractive to consumers
than D’s trendsetting offering (trailing is equivalent to increasing γ to 1). The result
is that M must lower its price and has lower market share. However, at the same level
of fixed cost - zero - M could partially close D’s novelty gap by producing a knockoff
collection. This allows the firm to adopt some elements of the novel design, free-riding
on D’s investment. Producing a mainstream collection is therefore always dominated
by imitation for the mass marketer.




















((1− β)(1 + β + 2(2− θ̄))− 2γ)2
36(1− β)
(2.6)
18Note that this assumption is not crucial for the results, as findings for the specification with endoge-
nous qualities are qualitatively similar. I present the model with endogenous qualities in Appendix
B.
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The importance of trendsetting status in the market to designers is clear: if M either
trails or imitates, D maintains a lead in novelty, which allows the designer firm to set
higher prices and earn higher profits than it would absent a novelty lead. Designer
prices and profits are increasing in the size of the lead, alternatively interpreted as the
perceived imperfection of the knockoff (recall that the larger is γ, the less well-received
is the knockoff).
If instead M chooses to produce its own novel collection, the firm can fully extinguish
D’s novelty lead and eliminate the designer’s trendsetting edge (equivalent to reducing
γ to 0), though to do so it must incur positive fixed costs. Optimal prices and payoffs




















((1− β)(1 + β + 2(2− θ̄)))2
36(1− β)
− Fnm. (2.10)
With no novelty gap, average prices are unchanged though designer prices and payoffs
are lower (the firm can no longer attract the trendsetting premium) and mass-market
prices and payoffs are higher. At stage 0.2, then, M will compare the payoffs under
imitation and under novelty and will imitate only if the increased profit associated with
producing a novel collection exceeds the increased fixed cost spend, or if:
γ(−5 + β(4 + β) + γ + 2θ̄(1− β))
9(1− β)
≥ Fnm. (2.11)
The mass-marketer will knockoff the designer’s collection otherwise. The better is the
consumer perception of the knockoff (the lower is γ), the more attractive is imitation
as a strategy for any mass-marketer. The critical value also confirms that different
types of mass market firms have different incentives to knockoff: for moderate levels of
γ, lower quality M-firms may prefer to knockoff a novel designer while higher quality
M-firms may elect to produce novel collections.
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I can more formally establish the critical quality levels for the mass marketer’s deci-










81Fnm − 4γ2(γ − (−3 + θ̄)2) + 36Fnmγ(−3 + θ̄) + 2γ(−2 + θ̄)
2γ
(2.13)
β3 = −2 + θ̄ +
√
−2γ + (−3 + θ̄)2 (2.14)
and summarizing, I have the following Lemma:
Lemma 2.1 If it faces a designer with a novel collection, the mass marketer will imi-
tate iff β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and will produce a novel collection otherwise.
Proof : See Appendix.
Such a specification is illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, which are drawn assuming
θ̄ = 1.4, γ = 0.21 and Fnm = 0.05.
Figure 2.2.: M profit with novel D
The effects of imitation are non-monotonic in mass-market quality, β. The intuition
is that for a given quality differential, closing the designer’s novelty lead increases profit
by allowing M to expand market share while charging a higher price on all units. A low
quality M serves only a small share of the market and even with novelty does not extend
this very much; further, producing a novel collection would see prices rise only slightly
from a low level. As a result, the returns to novelty do not compensate for the increased
spend. For a mid-quality M, the ability to expand share and to charge a higher price over
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Figure 2.3.: M Choices with novel D
more units increases profit significantly and thus novelty is preferable to an ordinary
collection. For moderate-to-high quality M, the quality differential with respect to D
is more narrow; even knocking off the designer, M would maintain significant market
share. As such, the returns to novelty would not compensate for additional fixed cost
spending. For the highest quality competitors, however, the quality differential with
respect to D is narrow enough that the firms are approaching horizontal competition.
A high quality M would never imitate, as any novelty lead by D would be sufficient to
allow D to capture the whole market.
The implications of the model are in line with observed outcomes in the market: given
designers producing novel collections, very low quality mass-market brands may prefer
to imitate while aspirational brands and close high-end designers produce their own
novel collections. However the model illustrates a mechanism somewhat different than
is generally assumed: it is not that low quality firms necessarily lack the resources or
ability to innovate, but rather they rationally select this action as the extra spending
associated with novel collections will not sufficiently increase profit (either prices or
market share) to compensate.
Note that for low values of γ, β2 and β1 converge and decline toward zero and
β3 → 1: the better is consumer perception of a knockoff, the more likely it is that any
mass-market firm prefers to imitate the designer.
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M’s strategy may therefore be stated as follows: if D produces an ordinary design,
M will produce a novel collection; if instead D produces a novel design, M will either
imitate or be novel, but will never choose to produce an ordinary design. The payoff
to the designer firm is strictly higher, regardless of M’s action, if it produces a novel
collection than if it produces a mainstream collection. D thus chooses to invest in
novelty.
Summarizing the foregoing and defining:
θ̂ =







2 + β − 2β2 + 2β3
)
, (2.16)
Lemma 2.2 Provided there is full market coverage and both firms operate, (i.e., if
θ̄ < θ̂ and γ < γ̂), the designer firm always produces a novel collection. In the absence
of design protection, the mass marketer imitates iff β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and
produces its own novel collection otherwise.
Proof : See Appendix.
If D leads in novelty, it can increase prices and profits over an imitating M: the novel
designer good is more coveted and the knockoff is relatively less attractive to con-
sumers. Even allowing for the fact that imitation helps trend formation as per Raustiala
and Sprigman (2006), the model confirms that, consistent with arguments set forth in
Hemphill and Suk (2009a), imitation by M hurts the designer firm, as knockoffs erode
the designer’s novelty lead.
2.5.2. Design Protection regime with λ = 0
Now assume that patent-style protection in the vein of the IDPPPA is available for
fashion designs, but that λ = 0. This suggests that consumers are only interested in
trendsetting design and that ownership of a design right carries no additional benefits
for the firm. The assumption of perfect protection means that if the designer chooses
to utilize the design protection system (that is, to claim protection for its design),
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imitation is no longer a profitable strategy for the mass market firm: D will win any
court action and M will be forced to transfer all profit to the designer as damages; the
payoff associated with knockoffs is reduced to zero.
At stage 0.2, if M faces a mainstream collection by D, it does better to present a
novel design and open a design lead. If it cannot take a lead, however, (i.e., if D has
produced a protected, novel collection) M must now decide only between producing a
mainstream collection or producing a novel collection. If it chooses the former, it trails
in novelty (equivalent to setting γ = 1); M will lose market share to the designer and
face downward pressure on price, as its product would be less attractive to consumers
than D’s novel design. If M chooses the latter, it can close the design gap (equivalent
to reducing γ to 0), and enjoy both higher market share and price relative to the
former case, though it must cover the fixed cost. Given the assumption that novelty is
sufficiently cheap, M will do better to invest in novelty.
M’s strategy may thus be summarized thusly: If D produces a mainstream collec-
tion M will produce a novel design and if D utilizes the design protection system and
produces a mainstream collection, M will produce a novel collection. The mass-market
firm reacts to a protected design by itself choosing novelty, though as novelty carries
no additional benefits it is indifferent between protecting and not protecting its design.
The key question for the designer is therefore: given such reactions by M, is it optimal
to utilize the design protection system in the first place? If D does protect, I have shown
that M will also invest in novelty; prices and profits will be given by (2.7) through (2.10).
If, however, the designer chooses not to protect, there is no impediment to imitation
and the situation is equivalent to the no-protection regime. In that case M does better
to imitate if β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and equilibrium prices and profits will be given
by (2.3) through (2.6). If the designer faces a mass-marketer with quality levels in
these ranges, using the protection system leaves D worse off than if no protection were
available: (2.5) exceeds (2.9). Use of the system thus either leaves the designer strictly
worse off (for relevant β) or indifferent (for all other β) relative to not using the system.
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D therefore chooses not to protect any novel design in the current season. I summarize
in the following:
Lemma 2.3 If design protection is available and λ = 0, the designer firm does not
protect its novel design. The mass marketer imitates iff β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and
produces its own novel collection otherwise.
The intuition is that while imitation narrows D’s novelty gap, it does not entirely
erode it; as such, while the designer would be better off if it could fully suppress
imitation and M continued to trail, in fact M will never choose to fall behind in novelty
if knockoffs are proscribed. If the designer utilizes the protection system, the result is
a complete erosion of its novelty lead. Because the designer earns higher profit being
imitated than it earns facing a novel mass-marketer collection, the rational response is
to not make use of the system.
One result of the model therefore is that if the design right allows for suppression of
imitation but the right itself carries no added value for consumers, high-end designers
may decline to use the protection system. This provides one possible explanation for
the dearth of case law with respect to the DPR in the EU: designers simply do not
assert protection against imitators (except in very limited cases).
The implication for US policymakers considering the IDPPPA is that while establish-
ing such a system would not necessarily leave firms any worse off relative to the current
no-protection landscape if λ = 0, the legal framework may remain under-utilized as
designers seek to maintain novelty leads. As such, resources invested in establishing
the design protection system may not be fully justified.
2.5.3. Design Protection regime with λ > 0
Assume again that IDPPPA-style protection for fashion design is available, but now
consider the case with λ > 0: the very ownership of a protected design carries benefits
for firms in the relevant selling season, as consumers not only enjoy possessing the
trendsetting item but, also receive pleasure from/attach significance to knowing that
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the fashion company has produced focal designs.
As shown in the preceding sub-section, if M faces a ordinary collection by D it will
produce a novel collection, and a mass-marketer facing a novel, protected collection
from D finds it preferable to produce a novel collection. With λ > 0, however, the
mass-market firm now also finds it beneficial to protect any novel design. M will thus
close any novelty and protection gaps. Optimal prices and profits are again given by
(2.7) through (2.10).
But what are M’s actions if D chooses not to utilize the protection system? In the
foregoing case, the designer could avoid the erosion of its novelty lead simply by not
seeking design protection; could a similar strategy be applied here? If the mass-market
firm faces a designer which has produced a novel collection but has declined to protect
it, there is no impediment to imitation. M could therefore choose to save on fixed
costs and knockoff, earning a payoff equal to (2.6); it could invest in novelty without
protecting, closing D’s novelty gap, earning a payoff equal to (2.10); or it could invest in
novelty and protect its design, thereby opening up a protection lead over the designer.




















((1− β)(1 + β + 2(2− θ̄)) + 2λ)2
36(1− β)
− Fnm. (2.20)
In this last case, participation by both firms is only guaranteed for sufficiently large
quality differential, or for β < β4 = 1 + θ̄ −
√
θ̄2 + 2λ (see Appendix). If a higher
quality mass-marketer opened a protection lead it would capture the whole market.
It is straightforward, then, that all such M firms have a clear incentive to seek a
protection lead. Within the range of quality differentials in which both firms operate
given a protection lead to M (i.e., β ∈ (0, β4]), what the firm earns if it takes a lead
(2.20) exceeds what it earns by imitating (2.6) only if λ is sufficiently high, specifically
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−4Fnm(−1 + β) + β4 − 2γ). (2.21)
If λ > λ̂, all mass-marketers would prefer investing in novelty and taking a protection
lead over a designer which has a novel, unprotected design. This critical value is
decreasing in the fixed cost of novelty, as expected, but interestingly is increasing in
mass-marketer quality, β. The model suggests it is the lowest quality M firms that are
most likely to invest in novelty and protect designs if protection is valuable to consumers
and the designer firm does not itself protect. This is because the protection lead, by
raising the overall attractiveness of the firm’s apparel to consumers, compensates for
low quality. This effect is most important for the lowest quality firms.
If λ ∈ (0, λ̂], M’s strategy is as follows: if D produces a mainstream collection, M will
produce a novel collection and protect it; if D produces a novel, protected collection, M
will produce a novel, protected collection; and if D produces a novel collection but does
not protect it, M will either knockoff or produce a novel, protected collection. Thus
ownership of the design protection is not valuable enough to drive mass-marketers with
quality in the relevant ranges of β away from a knockoff strategy if imitation is possible.
If it competes with such mass-marketers, then, the designer can avoid complete erosion
of its design lead if it declines to use the protection system. The situation again parallels
the no protection regime; if protection is not utilized, there is no legal impediment to
imitation and equilibrium prices and profits are given by (2.3) through (2.6).
If λ > λ̂, however, M’s strategy may be laid out as: if D produces a mainstream
collection, M will produce a novel collection and protect it; if D produces a novel,
protected collection, M will produce a novel, protected collection; and if D produces a
novel collection but does not protect it, M will produce a novel, protected collection.
Investing in novelty and using the design right system is a dominant strategy for the
mass-market firm. The designer, making its choice at stage 0.1, is aware that M will
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produce a novel, protected collection if the benefits associated with protection are suffi-
ciently high; its dominant strategy is to likewise produce a novel, protected collection in
such cases. Neither firm maintains a novelty lead or a protection lead and equilibrium
prices and profits are described by equations (2.7) through (2.10).
Lemma 2.4 If design protection is available and λ > λ̂, the designer and the mass
marketer both produce novel collections and choose to protect their respective designs.
The model suggests that if design protection is very valuable to a firm then, unsur-
prisingly, the system is more likely to be used. But does the design protection system
generate the expected benefit to the designer when it is used? Recall that if β ∈ (0, β1]
or β ∈ (β2, β3], the equilibrium outcome in the no protection regime is that the mass-
marketer produces a knockoff collection. This leaves the designer with an effective
novelty lead, γ, that is less than one but strictly positive. If design rights sufficiently
enhance the popularity of a novel collection or the reputation of the design house, I have
shown that suppressing imitative activity leads all mass-marketers to become design
innovators. The effect is to eliminate any novelty lead and to reduce the competitive
landscape to the standard vertical differentiation case. This leaves the designer firm
either indifferent or strictly worse off relative to what it would earn if no design pro-
tection were available: in both regimes D produces a novel collection, incurring fixed
costs of Fnd ; however it is only in the no protection regime that D is able to maintain
a small novelty lead.
The key here is that mass-marketers are imitators not by necessity but by choice -
they free-ride on the high-end designers’ spending on seasonal trends and silhouettes
so as to save on collection-related overheads. Should such free-riding be prohibited,
however, there is no reason to believe that such firms would be content to fall behind
both on quality and on design terms. Indeed, if ownership of a design right sufficiently
increases the status (and hence willingness to pay) associated with a fashion firm,
the mass-marketer will also have an incentive to secure such a right. For both firms,
investing in novelty and making use of the protection system is a dominant strategy.
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In equilibrium, both firms produce novel collections and there is no single, status-
conferring trend in the season.
Proposition 2.1 If β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and λ > λ̂, the designer firm is unam-
biguously worse off under design protection relative to the no protection regime.
The somewhat counter-intuitive outcome is that it is exactly when protection for
fashion designs yields valuable advantages that designer firms are worse off if protection
is available.
For mass-marketers, model outcomes are more in line with what may be expected:
firms that prefer to knockoff in the absence of protection are worse off if the design
protection system is used. However it is not because suppressing imitation leaves them
at a disadvantage in design. Rather, it is that these firms find themselves driven to
invest in novelty - hiring in design teams, for example - though the increased profit
associated with producing a competing novel design is low compared to the increased
fixed-cost spend. This is nonetheless the best available action, since trailing in both
novelty and design protection ownership yields an even smaller payoff.
Proposition 2.2 If β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and λ > λ̂, the mass-market firm is
worse off under design protection relative to the no protection regime.
How can it be that providing the intellectual property right can leave both firms
worse off? The intuition rests on the principle that design novelty is perceived only
in relation to the rival firm’s offering: consumers like displaying trendsetting apparel
and are therefore willing to pay more for such items, but this implies there must be
other firms lagging the trend. The design rights system may provide an incentive
for mass-marketers to close the trend gap, narrowing the effective degree of product
differentiation and making them more dangerous competitors to the higher-cost design
firms.
The model therefore provides a cautionary note for IDPPPA proponents: while imi-
tation does reduce the profitability of novel designs - the designer indeed makes lower
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profit if its design is imitated than it would make if it could enjoy the full extent of
a novelty lead - the designer will only be better off suppressing knockoffs if the mass-
marketer continues to trail in novelty. If instead the mass-marketers start to offer
competing designs, the effect of protection is to make the industry more competitive.
Results also suggest that the policy would lead to increased design innovation, but
that the increase would be driven by mass-marketers rather than designer firms. In-
deed, the model implies that high quality firms invest just as much in novel designs if
protection is available as they do if it is not. This is because even when imitation is
possible, the designer invests in novelty as failing to do so leaves it vulnerable to being
overtaken in design.
The overall message is that the proposed design rights system may in fact do designers
more harm than good, as fashion firms may find themselves trapped in a trend arms-
race: each spends to introduce new, attention-grabbing designs to outdo the rival, but
the result is that the competing designs in the marketplace effectively cancel each other
out and consumers judge the collections by brand/firm location, just as they would if
neither firm invested in novel designs.
Welfare Effects of Design Protection
I have shown that if design protection rights carry sufficient benefits to firms beyond
the ability to suppress imitation, certain mass-market firms’ equilibrium strategies dif-
fer from the no protection regime. What, then, is the welfare impact of the design
protection system if the system is utilized (i.e., if λ > λ̂)?
If design protection is not available or not utilized and β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3],
M will imitate and D will produce a novel collection. Substituting for prices into (2.1)






(−13− β4 + 44γ + 4β3(−5 + θ̄)− 28θ̄ − 4(γ + θ̄)2+




Total profit to the firms is given by the sum of (2.5) and (2.6).
If instead design protection is available and λ > λ̂, both firms will produce novel
collections. Again, I substitute for prices into (2.1), though now with Ud = θ − pd and
Um = θβ − pd. Total consumer surplus is now given by:
CSipr =
(−59− β(−9 + β(21 + β)) + 28θ̄ + 4β(10 + β)θ̄ − 4(−1 + β)θ̄2)
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(2.23)
and total profit to the firms is given by the sum of (2.9) and (2.10).
The increase in welfare under the design rights system relative to the no protection
regime may be expressed as:
W ipr −Wnp = ∆W = (18 + 5β
2γ + γ(−19 + 5γ + 10θ̄)− 2β(9− 7γ + 5γθ̄))
18(−1 + β) − F
n
m (2.24)
Proposition 2.3 If β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and λ > λ̂, welfare is unambiguously
lower in the design protection regime relative to a no protection regime.
Proof : See Appendix.
The intuition here is that high-end consumers prefer buying a novel design when
others in the market cannot, as the firm is a trendsetter. The presence of knockoffs
in the market erodes, but does not completely remove, this effect: designer customers
enjoy higher utility - even after considering the higher prices paid for such goods -
in the no protection regime. Further, as imitation allows mass-market customers to
participate in the status-conferring trend, they are also better off. Consumer surplus
is therefore higher without design protection.
Joint firm profit is also higher in the no protection regime: the trend lead means the
designer firm’s good is more attractive to consumers, allowing D to increase prices and
at the same time serve a larger share of the market. The imitating mass-marketer is
also better off, as it is able to increase prices and partially close the designer’s novelty
lead while saving on season fixed costs.
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A Prisoners’ Dilemma in Design Protection
I have shown above that with introduction of IDPPPA-style protection, only mass-
marketers such that β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] will change their strategic choice. In
all other cases, introduction of the system leaves firms indifferent relative to the no
protection regime. For the remainder of the discussion, I restrict attention to mass-
marketers in the aforementioned quality ranges and summarize the effects of introducing
a design protection system.
Figure 2.4 lays out the normal form of the game if IDPPPA-style protection is avail-
able for fashion designs.
The designer may choose to produce an ordinary design, which is ineligible for pro-
tection; to produce a novel design but decline to protect it; or to produce and protect
its novel design. The mass-marketer, moving second, has each of these choices as well,
plus the option of knocking off the designer’s collection. At stage 0.2, M has the benefit
of knowing which of the actions D has chosen.
First consider the case if λ ∈ (0, λ̂]. If the designer has produced a mainstream col-
lection, M’s best response is to produce a novel design and protect it: novelty without
protection requires the same fixed cost spend but offers a lower lead, and both main-
stream and knockoff collections do not allow for any lead at all. If D has produced a
novel design and protected it, the best M can do is to take the same action. If instead D
has produced a novel design but not protected it, then all mass-marketers with quality
in the ranges under consideration do best to imitate. The designer, moving at stage
0.1, can anticipate M’s strategic choices; if it produces a mainstream collection it will
trail; if it produces a novel collection it will not enjoy any trend or protection lead; and
if it produces a novel collection but does not protect, it can maintain a reduced trend
lead. Of these possibilities, D does best to choose novelty without protection. The
equilibrium with λ ∈ (0, λ̂], highlighted in blue in Figure 2.4, replicates the outcome in

































Now consider the game with λ > λ̂. Whatever the decision of the designer, M’s
best response is to produce a novel design and protect it: if the designer’s collection is
ordinary it can take a large lead; if the designer has produced a novel but unprotected
collection it can maintain a significant protection lead; and if the designer has similarly
produced a novel, protected collection it can close any leads. The designer, moving at
stage 0.1, can anticipate that M will play its dominant strategy. But even considering
all scenarios available, D does best to also produce and protect its novel collection.
The equilibrium with λ > λ̂ is highlighted in orange in Figure 2.4. Note, however, that
each firm enjoys higher profit if the designer leads and the mass-marketer imitates; in
this way, a trend is formed (increasing willingness to pay of both sets of consumers)
and only the designer incurs the fixed cost of novelty. Each firm is worse off playing
its dominant strategy of novelty with protection than it would be if the design system
were not used. I therefore lay out the main result of the paper:
Proposition 2.4 If β ∈ (0, β1] or β ∈ (β2, β3] and λ > λ̂, introduction of the design
protection system results in a Prisoners’ Dilemma in fashion protection: each firm
plays its dominant strategy and produces a novel, protected collection, even though each
would enjoy higher profit if the protection system were not used.
The equilibrium if no protection is available is a trend lead to D with imitation by M.
However, if consumers regard trendsetting firms (focal design producers) very highly,
introduction of the design system sets up a Prisoners’ Dilemma in design protection: M
will be unwilling to trail by the full extent of any novelty and protection gaps and will
produce and protect a novel design. D - equally unwilling to trail its rival - will do the
same. The result is that no trend emerges in the season and consumers judge designs
by firm quality, just as they would have done if each firm had produced an ordinary
collection.
The policy implication is, therefore, that it is preferable on welfare grounds not
to allow design protection for fashion goods, as once the option of legal protection is
available to the firms, they will either not use the system at all or will react in a manner
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that adversely impacts both competitors and consumer welfare. This a strong policy
conclusion, which runs counter to the conventional wisdom that increasing the action
space of an agent weakly increases welfare.
2.5.4. Licensing
I have shown above that if the design rights system is used, firm profits and welfare may
be lower than if no protection were available, but I have not so far allowed for licensing
of design rights. Now suppose that if D invests in novelty and protects its design at
stage 0.1, it could offer a license to M on entry at stage 0.2. This license constitutes
permission to produce an official (lower quality) copy of the novel, protected design
under M’s brand.
The firms license via Nash bargaining. If they cannot agree a license, the outcome is
as has already been shown: if the design system is used, each produces a novel, protected
collection. If firms successfully conclude a license, however, then they compete in
prices with D having both a protection and a trend lead. Licensing would therefore
allow the designer firm to maintain a larger effective lead. But this outcome is only
possible if both firms would be active in the market given such a combined lead for
D. This requires that the quality differential is sufficiently large, or more formally,
β ≤ β5 = −2 + θ̄ +
√
(−3 + θ̄)2 − 2(γ + λ).19
The surplus available to be shared in any licensing agreement is given by the difference
between joint profit if D has both a protection and a novelty lead and the joint profit
firms would make in the absence of licensing. I denote this surplus T , where:
T = Fnm −
2(γ + λ)
(




If the firms split the surplus equally20, the payoffs to the designer and mass-marketer,
respectively, under licensing are simply the outside option to each firm (firm payoff if
19If β ∈ (β5, 1), a designer with a combined novelty and protection lead would capture the whole
market.
20This assumption is somewhat more realistic but is not crucial for the results that follow. I summarize
the case if D can appropriate the full surplus in the Appendix. The outcome for D is qualitatively
similar to that presented here for low β.
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(−1− β)(1 + β − 2(1 + θ̄))2 − Y
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9Fnm(−1 + β)− 2(γ + λ)
(
−2 + β + β2 + γ + 2θ̄ − 2βθ̄ + λ
))
−1 + β
The designer’s payoff under licensing is smaller than its payoff in the no protection






9Fnm(−1 + β)− 2λ((−1 + β)(2 + β − 2θ̄) + λ)
−6 + 6β + 4λ
. (2.29)




(−1 + β + β2) + 1
2
√
4− 4β + 9β4 (2.30)
and have the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5 If λ > λ̂, β ∈ (0, β5] and firms equally split any surplus associated
with licensing, the designer will produce a novel collection and the mass-marketer a
licensed, lower quality version of the novel design. The designer is nonetheless worse off
under design protection with licensing relative to the no-protection regime if β ∈ (0, β1]
or β ∈ (β2, β3], λ̂ < λ < λ∗ and γ1 < γ < γ∗.
If β ∈ (β5, 1), no licensing is possible and both firms produce novel, protected designs.
Proof : See Appendix.
Intuitively, licensing would allow the designer to enjoy the benefits associated with
leading in both novelty and ownership of the protected design - it markets its product
with a larger effective gap than it could in the no protection regime. However, D must
transfer half of the joint benefit to the mass-marketer in order to successfully conclude
the agreement. The smaller are γ and λ (that is the better is the knockoff and the lower
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is consumer regard for ownership of design rights) the smaller is the surplus associated
with licensing and the less D is left with after its transfer to M. Thus, even allowing for
licensing, the designer firm could be worse off under design protection: the size of the
relevant transfer to M may outweigh the benefits of enjoying an expanded gap when
selling in the market, meaning that D earns a payoff that is smaller than it would earn
in the no protection regime.
Note that the agreement outlined here involves, either explicitly or implicitly, M
receiving from D a payment on signing the license, as the surplus shared between the
firms consists mainly (if not exclusively) of the benefits to D. Such an arrangement may
easily be understood as the basis of the diffusion line concepts which are growing in
popularity in the fashion industry: licensing with implicit payment to the mass-market
firm is consistent with designer firm lending its expertise and brand power to a lower-
quality rival via a collection designed by the high-end brand but sold under the lower
quality firm’s brand. Such undertakings have become increasingly popular in Europe
and in the US, with recent examples including: Isaac Mizrahi for Target (2002-2007),
Ronson for JC Penney (2009), Jimmy Choo for H&M (2009), Jean Paul Gaultier for
Target (2010), Lanvin for H&M (2010), Missoni for Target (2010), Jil Sander’s ‘+J’ at
Uniqlo (2009-2011) and Versace for H&M (2011).
This model therefore provides an alternative explanation for the proliferation of high-
street diffusion lines crafted by designers and would predict an increase in such activity
in the US in the wake of the aforementioned legislation.
2.6. Concluding Remarks
The model presented here is very stylized, focussing on a simple, sequential duopoly
game with key assumptions of low fixed costs of novelty and full market coverage, and
results should be read with the appropriate caution. I nevertheless feel that it succeeds
in illustrating a key scenario in which design protection may actually hurt designers,
mass-market firms and consumers.
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While the claims of designers seeking design rights protection do have some merit -
imitation hurts innovative firms relative to the case in which they could enjoy the full
extent of any novelty lead - it is by no means certain that such rights will leave them
better off. Indeed, in suppressing imitation protection rights may change the behavior
of the mass-marketers, inducing these lower quality - and lower cost - competitors to
innovate in design. Put more simply, while mass-market firms are happy to free-ride
on the innovator and trail slightly, they may not be prepared to fall totally behind in
novelty if free-riding is no longer permitted.
If design rights have little or no value in and of themselves, designers can avoid
any suboptimal outcome by simply declining to use the system, effectively sanctioning
knockoff activity. However if the ownership of design rights has a sufficiently high
value to consumers (for example as certification of the originality of the design) firms
may find themselves locked in a trend arms race, producing novel designs which simply
cancel each other out in the market, so that in the end only quality matters, just as it
would without any novelty in design. For certain parameter values licensing provides
a way to stave off the arms race, though even in this outcome designers may be worse
off relative to the no protection regime.
Fashion design protection policy may therefore have effects which run counter to the
expectations of proponents, harming even the firms that seem to most support such
legislation. The model also offers alternative explanations for both the lack of case law
surrounding the establishment of the European Design Right System and for the uptick
in designer-led diffusion lines at mass market stores.
There are several promising areas for extension of the model. These include incorpo-
rating a continuous novelty measure (as opposed to the binary choice here), exploring
the effects of imperfect design patents and expanding the time horizon of the model




A.1. Proof of Lemmata 2.1 & 2.2
Define θ∗ as the location of the consumer indifferent between buying from the designer
and the mass marketer given that the designer maintains novelty and/or protection
leads. Then θ∗ is the solution to Ud = Um (designer and mass-marketer qualities are
fixed at 1 and β < 1, respectively):
θ∗ = −−pd + pm + γ + λ
1− β
. (2.A.1)
θ∗ is internal to the support [(θ̄−1), θ̄] iff (pd−pm) ∈ [((1−β)(−1+ θ̄)+γ+λ), ((1−
β)θ̄ + γ + λ)].
Profits to the designer and mass-marketer, respectively, are given by:
πd = (pd −
1
2
)(θ̄ − θ∗); (2.A.2)
πm = (pm −
β2
2
)(θ∗ − (θ̄ − 1)). (2.A.3)











2pd − 4pm − 2(−1 + θ̄) + β(−2 + β + 2θ̄)− 2(−1 + γ + λ)
2(1− β)
= 0. (2.A.5)
If no protection is available, λ = 0. If there is imitation by M, γ > 0, so that the
simultaneous solution yields the candidate equilibrium prices given in (2.3) and (2.4). If
there is novelty by both firms, γ = 0 and the simultaneous solution yields the candidate
prices given in (2.7) and (2.8). These prices satisfy the second order conditions.
These candidate prices are substituted into the profit functions to generate the profit
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equations shown in (2.5) and (2.6), and (2.9) and (2.10), respectively.
Full market coverage with both firms active in the market requires that: (i) the price
differential is such that θ∗ is internal to the support of consumer tastes; (ii) the customer
with the lowest marginal utility of quality, (θ̄ − 1), finds it preferable to purchase the
product; and (iii) prices are non-negative.
For given trendsetting and protection leads, the marginal θ customer is internal to
the support of tastes iff the quality differential is sufficiently large, or if:
β < β̆ = −2 + θ̄ +
√
(−3 + θ̄)2 − 2(γ + λ). (2.A.6)
which corresponds to β3 at (2.14) for λ = 0. The closer are firms in the quality
dimension the closer is the market to horizontal competition and the stronger is the
benefit associated with a lead. A leading designer captures the whole market (θ∗ =
(θ̄−1)) if β = β3 and therefore any M with higher quality will always close any novelty
or protection leads.
The utility of the lowest θ customer given the candidate prices is:





−5 + 2(1 + 2β)θ̄ − 2(−2 + β + β2 + 2γ)
)
. (2.A.8)
Solving Um(θ̄ − 1) = 0 for θ̄, I obtain:
θ̄0 =
−1 + 2β(1 + β) + 4γ − 2λ
2(1 + 2β)
(2.A.9)
with positive surplus requiring θ̄ > θ̄0.
Setting the candidate pm to zero and solving for θ̄ yields:
θ̄1 =
5 + 2(2− β)β − 2γ − 2λ
2(1− β)
(2.A.10)
with non-negative price requiring θ̄ < θ̄1. This particular restriction arises because in
this setup I abstract from optimizing behaviour in respect of quality. For any higher
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value of θ̄, the very lowest quality firms would have to reduce prices to zero and market
participation by both firms is not satisfied.
This critical value θ̄1 is equivalent to θ̂ in (2.14) for λ = 0. Comparing (2.A.9) and
(2.A.10), θ̄1 > θ̄0 ∀ γ < γ̂ = 12
(
2 + β − 2β2 + 2β3 − 2βλ
)
.
Full market coverage and participation by both firms, given exogenous qualities, thus
requires that the market is not too rich and that knockoffs are perceived sufficiently
well.
To determine whether M prefers imitation or novelty, I set (2.6)=(2.10) and solve for









81Fnm − 4γ2(γ − (−3 + θ̄)2) + 36Fnmγ(−3 + θ̄) + 2γ(−2 + θ̄)
2γ
Straightforward comparison illustrates that (2.6) > (2.10)∀β < β1 and β > β2 and
(2.6) < (2.10)∀β ∈ (β1, β2).
A.2. M choice if D does not protect and λ > 0
If M opens up a protection lead over D, Ud = θ − pd + 1 and Um = θβ − pm + 1 + λ.
I find the consumer indifferent to buying from the designer and the mass-marketer by
setting Ud = Um and solving for the marginal consumer and proceed with the profit-
maximization in a manner analogous to that followed in Appendix A.1. Optimal prices
and profits in (2.17) through (2.20).
If facing a novel, unprotected design by D, M has 4 choices: it may produce a
mainstream collection and trail the designer firm; it may imitate the designer firm; it
may produce a novel design and choose not to protect it; or it may produce a novel
design and protect it.
I can rule out the first and third strategies: the first because producing a mainstream
collection would mean trailing the designer in novelty and generating a lower total payoff
then investing in novelty; and the third because investing in novelty but not protecting
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would mean foregoing the costless option of taking a protection lead over the designer.
Any investment in novelty is therefore accompanied by utilization of the design right
system.
Left to consider are the second and fourth strategies. If the mass market firm imitates,
it earns a payoff equal to (2.6). If the mass-market firm is novel and seeks design
protection, both firms operate iff β < β4 = 1 + θ̄ −
√
θ̄2 + 2λ. Note also that β4 > β̆.
Comparing the payoffs, (2.20) exceeds (2.6) iff γ > −λ and θ̄ < θ̄2 where
θ̄2 =
9Fnm(1− β)− 5γ + 4βγ + β2γ + γ2 − 5λ+ 4βλ+ β2λ− λ2
2(−1 + β)(γ + λ) . (2.A.11)
I compare this critical value to θ̂ to establish which is larger; if θ̄2 > θ̂, then for all







−4Fnm(−1 + β) + β4 − 2γ
)
. (2.A.12)
This critical value is renamed λ̂ in the text.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 2.3
Total welfare in the no protection regime is given by:
Wnp =
1
72(−1 + β) (−65− 72F
n
d (−1 + β)− 5β4 + 76γ + 4θ̄ − 20(γ + θ̄)2 + 4β3(−7 + 5θ̄)+
β2(6− 20γ + 4(9− 5θ̄)θ̄) + β(92 + 20θ̄(−3 + 2θ̄) + 8γ(−7 + 5θ̄)) (2.A.13)





−7− 72Fnd − 72Fnm − β(27 + β(33 + 5β))− 4θ̄ + 4β(14 + 5β)θ̄ − 20(−1 + β)θ̄2
)
(2.A.14)
The welfare effect of design protection is therefore given by (2.A.14) minus (2.A.13),
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denoted ∆W at (2.24) in the text. The overall sign of the welfare effect of design
protection depends on the sign of the numerator of the first term in the ∆W expression
as the denominator of the first term is negative. The numerator of the first term is
positive, rendering the entire expression negative, iff γ > 0, β < 1 and θ̄ > θ′ where
θ′ =
(18− 18β − 19γ + 14βγ + 5β2γ + 5γ2)
(−10γ + 10βγ)
. (2.A.15)
This term is increasing in gamma and so will be highest if γ is at its maximum, γ̂.








+ 10β(1 + β)− 7
2 + β(1 + 2(−1 + β)β)
)
< 0. (2.A.16)
As such, even at its highest possible value, this critical value for θ is negative. The
numerator of the first term of the expression is therefore positive, and the entire ex-
pression for ∆W negative, for all relevant values of θ̄. Welfare is lower under design
protection.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.5
The benefit to the designer from agreeing a license with M is given by the difference
between what the firm would earn if M imitated its protected, novel design under the
contract and what it would earn absent licensing (if M also produced a novel, protected
design), with the latter given by (2.9). If M imitates with λ > 0, D earns:
πim−pd =
((1− β)(4 + 1 + β − 2θ̄))− 2(γ + λ)2
36(1− β)
− Fnd . (2.A.17)
The designer’s benefit is therefore the increase in profit it earns if M chooses to trail
in both novelty and design right ownership in the market (which it agrees to do if
licensing) versus investing in novelty and removing D’s lead. Denote this benefit by H,
where:
H = − (γ + λ)(1 + β




The benefit to the mass-marketer from entering the license agreement is similarly given
by the difference between what it would be able to earn if it produces a licensed copy
of the design but incurs a reduced fixed cost spend and what it would earn absent
licensing (that is, if it produces a novel, protected collection). If it produces a novel
collection, it earns a payoff equal to (2.10) and if it imitates D’s protected design it
earns:
πim−pm =
((1− β)(1 + β + 2(2− θ̄))− 2(γ + λ)2
36(1− β)
(2.A.19)
the benefit to M is therefore the cost saving associated with imitation net of any reduc-
tion in profit it experiences from trailing in both novelty and design rights ownership.
Let the overall benefit to M be denoted by G, where:
G =
9Fnm(−1 + β) + (γ + λ)(−5 + β2 + γ − 2β(−2 + θ̄) + 2θ̄ + λ)
9(−1 + β)
(2.A.20)
The surplus available under bargaining is therefore T = G + H, defined at (2.25) in
the text.
I assume that the firms split the surplus equally; as such, firm payoffs under licensing
are simply the firm’s outside option (what it earns absent licensing) plus 12T and are
defined in (2.26) and (2.27), respectively, for the designer and the mass-marketer.
In order to establish whether firms are better off under licensing relative to the no
protection case, I compare payoffs under licensing to the payoffs under no protection,
given at (2.5) and (2.6), respectively.
The designer is worse off under licensing - (2.5) exceeds (2.26) - iff β < 1, Fnm > 0,
λ < 12(3− 3β) and:
γ <
9Fnm(−1 + β) + 4λ− 2βλ− 2β2λ− 4θ̄λ+ 4βθ̄ − 2λ2
−6 + 6β + 4λ
(2.A.21)
and these critical values for λ and γ are renamed λ∗ and γ∗, respectively, in the text.
It remains to show that such values are possible for the range of parameters in which
design protection is utilized. Recall that design protection is used as long as λ > λ̂ and
that the maximum novelty lead possible under imitation is given by γ̂.
This requirement on γ is not restrictive as whether this restriction is larger or smaller
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than γ̂, there is a non empty set of values which satisfy it. I then must compare λ∗ and
λ̂. λ∗ > λ̂ - so that there is a non-empty set of values for which D will choose to use







γ ≤ 32 and F < F
∗ where:
F ∗ =
(−9 + 18β + 9β2 − 18β3 − 12γ + 12βγ + 12β2γ − 4γ2)
36(−1 + β)
. (2.A.22)
Note that the condition on β is always satisfied (this critical value exceeds β5), and
the condition on F is satisfied iff γ > γ1 = 32(−1 + β + β
2) + 12
√
4− 4β + 9β4. I next
compare this value to γ̂. γ̂ > γ1 - so there is a non-empty set of values satisfying all
requirement - for moderate to low values of β.
A.5. Licensing outcome for D if it appropriates the full Surplus
Let us now suppose that D is able to extract the full amount of any surplus in a licensing
agreement. (Note, however, that with such a division of the surplus licensing may be
concluded over a narrower range of low-quality mass-marketers than in the case where
the surplus is split). In this situation, M is restricted to its outside option (what it
earns absent licensing, its payoff if both firms are novel and protect) given in the text
at (2.10), while D earns:
π=d
(= 1 + β − 2θ̄) + 8(γ + λ)(−2 + β + β2γ + 2θ̄ − 2βθ̄ + λ)
36(1− β)
.
Comparison of this payoff to D’s payoff under the no protection regime show that D
is better off with no protection if β < 1, F > 0, and either (i) λ < λ1 and γ ∈ (γ1, γ2)
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(5− β(4 + β − 2θ̄)− 2θ̄ − 4λ+
√
K)
where J = (−1 + β)(36Fnm + (−1 + β)(7 + 10β + β2 − 4(5 + β)θ̄ + 4θ̄))
and K = 36Fnm(−1 + β) + (−1 + β)2(5 + β − 2θ̄)2 + 24(−1 + β)λ+ 8λ2
Recall that the firm would only make use of the design system if λ > λ̂. There exists a
non-empty set of parameter values for which D would use the system but nevertheless
be worse off with licensing - even receiving the entire surplus - if either:
• λ ∈ (λ̂, λ1) and γ ∈ (γ1, γ2); or
• λ ≥ max {λ̂, λ2} and γ ∈ (γ1, γ2)
The former set of requirements is met for low β. Note that in the licensing agreement,
M is driven down to its outside option, the payoff it earns if neither firm enjoys a lead.
The surplus that is appropriated by D is comprised of the increase in joint profit if D
can lead by (γ+λ); as such it takes account of the fact that in such a market outcome,
M would be much worse off than D.
B. Appendix 2: The Model with Endogenous Quality
B.1. The no-protection regime
Suppose now that firms are free to select quality as well as novelty when deciding on
the season’s apparel collection and further that no design protection is available. The
designer moves first, acting as a Stackelberg leader in quality selection.
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((sd − sm)(sd + sm + 2(2− θ̄))− 2γ)2
36(sd − sm)
(2.B.4)
which correspond to expressions (2.3) through (2.6) for sd = 1 and sm = β.











2pd − 4pm − 2sd(−1 + θ̄) + sm(−2 + sm + 2θ̄)− 2(γ + λ)
2(sd − sm)
= 0 (2.B.6)








(s2d − 2sd(−2 + θ̄) + 2sm(−2 + sm + θ̄)− 2(γ + λ)). (2.B.8)
These prices satisfy the second order conditions.
Plugging these expressions into the profit functions, the profits at stage 1.1 are:
πed =




((sd − sm)(sd + sm + 2(2− θ̄))− 2(γ + λ))2
36(sd − sm)
. (2.B.10)
The designer is a Stackelberg leader, so that its quality is known at stage 0.2. Thus to
find the optimal quality choice of the mass-marketer given sd, I differentiate (2.B.10)









This expression yields four (4) candidate qualities:
s1m = −2 + θ̄ −
√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 − 2(γ + λ)
s2m = −2 + θ̄ +
√




(−2 + 2sd + θ̄ −
√




(−2 + 2sd + θ̄ +
√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ))
I select the quality which results in highest profit and satisfies the second order con-
dition: s3m.
At stage 0.1, the designer can predict the mass-marketer’s quality choice and substi-
tutes for sm in its profit function, which then becomes:
πed =




12(2 + sd − θ̄ +
√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ))
X = (−2 + 2sd + θ̄ −
√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)).







(19 + 4s2d − 24γ + 8θ̄ + 4θ̄2 − 8sd(1 + θ̄)− 24λ−
18√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)
+
27sd√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)
+
72γ√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)
− 27θ̄√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)
+
72λ√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)
− 16
√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)+
4sd
√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)− 4θ̄
√
(2 + sd − θ̄)2 + 6(γ + λ)) = 0.
This expression yields four (4) candidate qualities:












3− 8(γ + λ)








9 + 8(γ + λ).
The solution which provides highest profits and satisfies the second order condition is









9 + 8(γ + λ)− 1
6
√
45 + 32(γ + λ)− 12
√
9 + 8(γ + λ).
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(387 + 280γ + 280λ− 96
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 12Se + 4(27θ̄(2 + θ̄)−
27θ̄
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+
√




(423 + 128γ + 108θ̄2 + 128λ− 84
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 24Se+
8
√
9 + 8γ + 8λSe − 36θ̄(2
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ Se)); (2.B.13)
Se =
√
45 + 32γ + 32λ− 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ.
Full market coverage with both firms active in the market requires that (i) the price
differential is such that θ∗ is internal to the support of consumer tastes; (ii) the customer
with the lowest marginal utility of quality, (θ̄ − 1), finds it preferable to purchase the
product; and (ii) prices are non-negative.
For given trendsetting and protection leads, the marginal θ customer is internal to
the support of consumer tastes iff the combined effective lead of the designer is not too
large, specifically if λ ≥ 0 and γ ∈ (0, 81128 − λ].
The utility of this lowest θ customer given the candidate prices is:
Um(θ̄ − 1) = (θ̄ − 1)sm − pm + (1− γ) =
1
216
(−207 + 344γ + 108(−2 + θ̄)θ̄ − 128λ+ 156
√
9 + 8(γ + λ) + 12Se − 8
√
9 + 8(γ + λ)Se);
Se =
√
45 + 32γ + 32λ− 12
√
9 + 8(γ + λ).







315 + 344γ + 128λ− 156
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ− 12Se + 8
√
9 + 8γ + 8λSe
)
(2.B.14)
Only the larger root is acceptable, and positive surplus requires θ̄ > θ̄e0.











−45 + 16γ + 16λ+ 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ− 6Se +
√
9 + 8γ + 8λSe)
(2.B.15)
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Only the larger root is acceptable. Strictly non-negative price (and profit) requires
θ̄ > θ̄e1.
Satisfaction of the requirements for full market coverage and participation by both
firms therefore restricts θ̄ > max{θ̄e0, θ̄e1} and γ ∈ (0, 81128 − λ].
If full market coverage obtains, the optimal prices and qualities in the absence of




(387 + 280γ − 96
√
9 + 8γ + 12Se1 + 4(27θ̄(2 + θ̄)− 27θ̄
√






(423 + 128γ + 108θ̄2 − 84
√
9 + 8γ + 24Se1 + 8
√
9 + 8γSe1 − 36θ̄(2
√
9 + 8γ + Se1); )














45 + 32γ − 12
√
9 + 8γ.
The price charged by a leading designer (imitating mass-marketer) is increasing (de-
creasing) in γ, the size of the novelty lead in the presence of knockoffs.
However optimal qualities are decreasing in γ: if it can maintain a novelty lead, as
it does if the mass-marketer imitates, the designer will optimally select a lower quality.
Because novelty and quality independently enter the consumer’s utility function, the
firm can view these as substitutes - increasing either will make its product more ap-
pealing. Further, both aspects are costly but only quality increases the marginal costs
of production; a rational firm finds it profitable to invest in novelty and reduce quality,
as this would allow it to take share from the rival and spread the fixed costs over a
larger scale.
The mass-marketer optimally responds by locating some distance from the designer
in order to minimize price competition; as such, the lower is the optimal quality selected







9 + 8γ + Se
)
, is increasing in γ: the greater is the designer’s novelty
lead, the farther away from the designer the mass-marketer will be forced to locate.
From the foregoing, it is clear that in the absence of design protection, quality and
a novelty lead are substitutes for the designer firm - in possession of a design novelty
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lead, it reduces the quality offered. The larger is its novelty lead, (the more imperfect
the knockoff, or the larger is γ), the larger is the quality differential.
The designer has a clear incentive to invest in novelty; the mass-marketer faces the
choice of partially closing the novelty gap and paying lower season fixed costs, or fully









The mass-marketer will knockoff the designer if the costs of novelty are sufficiently
high, that is, only if Fnm > F̂nm, and will produce its own, novel collection otherwise.




















(16γ + (3 +
√




9 + 8γ − Se1))
− Fnd ;
πnpm = −
(−45 + 16γ + 12
√






9 + 8γ − Se1))
. (2.B.17)
Market share and profit of the designer (mass-marketer) are increasing (decreasing)
in γ, confirming that the payoff to the designer firm is higher the larger is its effective
novelty lead. As in the previous section, the designer is harmed by imitation relative
to what it would earn if M trailed fully in novelty, but it nevertheless benefits from the
reduced novelty lead.
B.2. The effect of Design Protection when λ = 0
If design protection is available and is utilized, the mass market firm no longer finds it
profitable to knockoff: at stage 0.2 it now must decide whether to trail and produce a
very low quality or to invest and produce a novel collection of somewhat higher quality.
If it chooses to produce a mainstream collection, M will be forced to locate very far
away from D in the quality spectrum to relax price competition, as D maintains both
a novelty and a quality lead. The low quality attracts low prices and low share. If
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instead it chooses to produce a novel collection, M can fully close the novelty gap and
return the competitive landscape to the standard vertical differentiation setup. It is
not forced as far away from the designer in quality terms and is able to charge higher
prices while serving more of the market. M will therefore always choose to produce a
novel collection if design protection is utilized.
The designer, aware that its novelty lead will be fully eroded if it protects its design,
will invest in novelty but will not protect its design at the previous stage.
The equilibrium - D produces a novel collection but does not protect, and M imitates
once fixed costs are sufficiently low - mirrors the outcome in the parallel case with
endogenous quality.
B.3. The effect of Design Protection when λ > 0
If design protection is utilized and novelty carries benefits for the firm over and above
the ability to suppress imitation, here as in the parallel case with exogenous costs, M
faces slightly different choices. If D declines to protect a novel design, M considers if to
trail, imitate, produce a novel design without protecting, or produce a novel design and
take the protection lead. I again rule out the first and third strategies and consider only
the second and fourth. If it opts for the second, M’s payoff is given in (2.B.17). If it
chooses the fourth, I solve for optimal prices and payoffs in a manner analogous to that

















Note that the marginal consumer is internal to the support of tastes iff λ < 98 . M
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does better to take a protection lead rather than imitating D iff λ exceeds:
λ̂′ = (−9 + (729(1405 + 72Fnm(13 + 9Fnm)) + 3888(127− 144Fnm)γ + 497664γ2 + 131072γ3−
341172
√
9 + 8γ − 227448Fnm
√
9 + 8γ − 10368γ
√


















9 + 8γSe1 − 23328Fnm
√
9 + 8γSe1 + 10368γ
√
9 + 8γSe1 + 8192γ
2
√
9 + 8γSe1 + Z)
1
3 )2/(96(729(1405 + 72Fnm(13 + 9F
n
m)) + 3888(127− 144Fnm)γ+
497664γ2 + 131072γ3 − 341172
√
9 + 8γ − 227448Fnm
√





9 + 8γ − 147456γ2
√









1 − 61440γ2Se1 − 37908
√





9 + 8γSe1 + 8192γ
2
√




Z = (−531441 + (472392(Fnm)2 + 131072γ3 + 2048γ2(243− 72
√
9 + 8γ − 30Se1+
4
√
9 + 8γSe1) + 1296γ(381− 8
√
9 + 8γ + 8Se1 + 8
√
9 + 8γSe1)− 729
(−1405 + 468
√
9 + 8γ − 156Se1 + 52
√





+ 45Se1 − 12
√
9 + 8γSe1 + 32γ(−9 + 2
√




Producing a novel collection and protecting is a dominant strategy for the mass-
marketer if λ > λ̂′: it can take a novelty lead and attract customers even while it
relaxes the quality offered.
Aware of this, the designer will therefore always itself produce a novel collection
and protect the design. Imposition of design protection therefore results in both firms
producing novel designs and using the design protection system. Neither firm maintains




(19 + 12(−1 + θ̄)θ̄); pnpm =
1
24
(35 + 12(−3 + θ̄)θ̄); (2.B.22)
snpd = θ̄ − 1/2; s
np
m = θ̄ − 3/2. (2.B.23)
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Welfare Effects of Design Protection
If design protection is not available or not utilized (as is the case if λ < λ̂′) and
Fnm > F̂
n
m, M will imitate and D will produce a novel collection. I simply substitute for







9 + 8γ + 8Se1)− 3(585− 372
√
9 + 8γ + 6Se1+
20
√
9 + 8γSe1 − 324(−1 + θ̄)θ̄)
)
. (2.B.26)
and total profit to the firms is given by the sum of (2.B.19) and (2.B.20). Total welfare








45 + 32γ − 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8γ(−531+
80
√
9 + 8γ + 40
√
45 + 32γ − 12
√
9 + 8γ) + 9(−3 + 80
√
9 + 8γ + 26√
45 + 32γ − 12
√
9 + 8γ + 108(−1 + θ̄)θ̄ − 216Fnmκ)) (2.B.27)
If instead design protection is available and λ > λ̂′, both firms will produce novel
collections. Again, I substitute for prices ad qualities into (2.2), and total consumer




(−35 + 36θ̄(−1 + θ̄)) (2.B.28)
and total profit to the firms is given by the terms in (2.B.21) and (2.B.22). Total




(−11− 72Fnd − 72Fnm − 12θ̄ + 36θ̄2) (2.B.29)
If design protection provides sufficient additional benefits to firms, then the increment
in welfare if moving from the no protection regime to a design rights regime may be
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expressed as:






9 + 8γSe1 − 63Se1 + 6
√
9 + 8γSe1 − 4γ(−387 + 80
√
9 + 8γ + 40Se1)
)
− Fnm. (2.B.30)
This expression is negative (that is, welfare is lower with design protection relative
to no protection) if γ ≥ −98 ; welfare is therefore unambiguously lower in the design
protection regime.
So far, then, all results mirror those in the exogenous quality case. Welfare is lower
with design protection, even though such protection forces both firms to provide higher
quality goods to the market, as this increase in quality does not increase consumer
surplus sufficiently to compensate for the loss of the profit associated with the status-
related aspect of design.
Licensing
Now allow for licensing of the design right. Recall that in the no protection regime, M
will knockoff iff novelty is sufficiently costly. Given that this condition is satisfied, both
firms are worse off under design protection.
The benefit to the designer from licensing is the difference between what it would
earn if M produces a sanctioned imitation of its protected, novel design and what it
would earn absent licensing (if M also produced a novel, protected design). The latter
is given in (2.B.25). If M imitates, D earns:
πim−pd = −
(16(γ + λ) + (3 +
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ)(3 +
√
45 + 32γ + 32λ− 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ))2
486(−6 +
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ−
√
45 + 32γ + 32λ− 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ)
(2.B.31)
The benefit to the mass-marketer from entering the license agreement is the difference
between what it earns if it produces a licensed copy of the protected design and what
it would earn absent licensing (that is, if it also produces a novel, protected collection).
If it produces a novel collection, it earns the payoff given in (2.B.28) and if it imitates
59
D’s protected design it earns:
πim−pm = −
(−45 + 16(γ + λ) + 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ− 6Se +
√
9 + 8γ + 8λSe)2
(486(−6 +
√




45 + 32γ + 32λ− 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ.





162 + 486Fnm − 99
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 63Se − 6
√
9 + 8γ + 8λSe + 32(γ + λ)(
− 9 + 4
√





45 + 32γ + 32λ− 12
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ.
If firms split the bargaining surplus equally, it is again the case that the designer may
still be worse off with design protection relative to no protection. Firm payoffs under
licensing are simply the firm’s outside option (what it earns absent licensing) plus 12T




(594 + 486Fnm − 99
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 63Se − 6
√
9 + 8γ + 8λSe+
32γ(−9 + 4
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 2Se) + 32λ(−9 + 4
√






9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 63Se − 6
√
9 + 8γ + 8λSe+
32γ(−9 + 4
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 2Se) + 32λ(−9 + 4
√
9 + 8γ + 8λ+ 2Se)+
2(16γ + (3 +
√
9 + 8γ)(3 +
√





9 + 8γ −
√




In order to establish whether firms are better off under licensing relative to the no
protection case, I compare payoffs under licensing to the payoffs under no protection,
given at (2.B.17) and (2.B.18)-(2.B.19), respectively.
It is again the case that the designer firm is worse off under licensing relative to the
no protection case if λ and γ are sufficiently low. Solutions for the critical values do
not admit a neat analytical expression. I therefore rely on a numerical example:
Example Suppose that λ = 0.1, γ = 0.1 and Fnm = 0.05. Designer payoff under
licensing minus payoff under the no protection framework simplifies to -0.0022961; the
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designer firm is (just) worse off under design protection, even with licensing, relative
to a no protection case. Suppose instead that λ = 0.15 with γ = 0.1 and Fnm = 0.05;
this difference becomes 0.0198941; the designer firm is (just) better off with the design
protection in place and a licensing agreement signed than it would be if no protection
applies.
The model with endogenous quality therefore yields conclusions which are consistent
with the ones which may be derived from an examination of the exogenous quality case.
61
3. Broad (American) Way? Litigation Cost
Allocation Rules and Patent Design in
Differentiated Duopoly
Abstract
Recent policy debates suggest increasing concern that US patents provide too
much power to patentees, a particular worry in highly sequential industries such as
biotechnology. This paper contributes to the literature on patent design and legal
fee shifting, contrasting the effects of the American (‘each party pays’) rule and
English (‘losing party pays’) rules on optimal patent breadth when innovation is
sequential, litigation spending is endogenous and differentiated duopolists compete
in prices. I show that if R&D costs are sufficiently low, the American rule may
induce broader patents and a higher probability of infringement than the English
rule. This is because in a loser pays system firms must explicitly take account of
legal spending by their rivals and this can set off an arms race in legal spending. The
Patent Office can suppress this behaviour by making patents narrower, encouraging
Courts to focus more on the inherent merits of the case. Broad American patents
therefore may not, per se, harm innovation. If, however, R&D costs are moderate,
the ranking is reversed and it is the English rule that leads to broader patents.
Neither rule supports lower patent breadth over the entire parameter space.
Keywords: American rule, English rule, Fee-shifting, Patent Licensing
JEL Classifications: D21, K41, L13, O34
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3.1. Introduction
Patent design is especially challenging in the context of sequential innovation, as policy-
makers must balance the need to incentivize investment by early innovators against the
need to accommodate later stage developers. Recent policy debates in the US suggest
increasing concern that the US Patent and Trademark Office has given too much weight
to the early innovation aspect and that US patents are too broad, stifling later stage
products. The biotechnology and genomic fields provide perhaps the best examples of
the sequential innovation motivating this work, as R&D inputs (research tools), which
consist largely of genetic and biological material, are virtually impossible to invent
around. The importance of key research tools therefore means that firms in this sector
tend to patent much more frequently than in other industries, a phenomenon which
has led to concern in the legal and economic fields about the impact of patent assertion
and licensing failure on future R&D. High profile cases, such as last year’s ruling by the
US Federal Circuit Court of Appeals that human genetic material can be patented (a
reversal of a lower Court’s ruling to invalidate the patents held by Myriad Genetics on
the BRCA-1 and BRCA-2 genes and tests for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer),
have served to reinforce these fears.
Patent policy is further complicated by the fact that enforcing protection of the
patent asset is costly. In the US, direct legal fees alone are now estimated at between
US$1 and 3 million to each party (American Intellectual Property Law Association
2001 figures, as reported in Bessen and Meurer (2008)) while indirect costs - including
business losses due to increased perception of risk - are even higher. These costs are
non-trivial and significantly impact firm behaviour.
To date, however, there has been little theoretical work done to link patent design
and the litigation cost allocation mechanism. Models of patent policy have tended to
overlook legal costs entirely (assuming them, along with all other transactions costs, to
be zero) and models of legal cost allocation have simply compared litigants’ behaviour
across systems for a given patent breadth, ignoring policymakers’ potential reactions
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to the structure of the cost allocation system. This paper is an attempt to fill this
gap. Using a Singh and Vives (1984) differentiated duopoly setting with endogenous
legal costs, I contrast the effect of the American rule (where each party pays its own
litigation costs, regardless of judgement) with the English rule (where the losing party
pays all litigation costs) on the Patent Office’s choice of patent breadth.1 Consistent
with earlier results, I show that the English rule induces more overall spending than the
American rule. Interestingly, this is in many cases due to greater spending by patentee
firms. However this does not necessarily translate into the patentee enjoying a higher
probability of prevailing in infringement suits. Instead I find that, all else equal, the
American rule induces broader patents and a higher overall probability of infringement
than the English rule only if R&D costs are sufficiently low. This is because under the
English rule, firms must explicitly take into account the legal spending of their rivals
and this can set off an arms race in legal spending. The Patent Office can suppress
this behaviour by making patents narrower, encouraging Courts to focus more on the
inherent merits of the case. As such, broader American patents do not necessarily
harm later-stage innovation and are not, per se, evidence of any inherent bias at the
Patent Office, but rather a rational response to the legal cost allocation mechanism.
By contrast, if R&D costs are moderately high, the English rule may induce broader
patents. Thus neither rule assures narrower patents than the other over the entire
parameter space. The implication for policy is that any attempt to change effective
patent breadth in the US without considering the effects of the cost allocation regime
on firms’ optimal legal spending may reduce incentives to innovate.
The next section outlines the related theoretical literature. The model is formulated
in section 3.3, which details firm payoffs and feasible patent breadths under each cost
1The American Rule, so called as it is the prevailing regime in the US, prescribes that save in very
particular cases- principally fraud, bad faith or willful infringement - a party pays its own litigation
costs. By contrast, one of the longest held tenets of the UK civil law framework is that the losing
party is called upon to pay the costs incurred by its rival on judgment. In this rule too there are
a few exceptional circumstances, such as where a party unreasonably fails to take up a settlement
offer or fails to act pursuant to Court arbitration recommendations. This losing party pays rule is
not exclusively English, however, as it applies across a wide range of countries. Interestingly, the
U.S. state of Alaska also follows this rule.
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allocation regime and discusses policy implications. Section 3.4 concludes and offers
possible extensions to the current work.
3.2. Previous Work
This work draws on two strands of literature: optimal patent design and legal cost
allocation (or fee-shifting).
The analysis of optimal patent design dates back to Nordhaus (1967), with more re-
cent contributions from Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and Klemperer (1990), before Green
and Scotchmer (1995) explicitly explores optimal design in the context of sequential
innovation. The main finding of that work is that where the key characteristics of later
stage innovations are known, infinitely broad patents are optimal for ensuring entry
by the first stage innovator. Chang (1995) builds on Green and Scotchmer (1995) and
concludes that very broad protection is best only where social value of first stage inno-
vation is either very high or very low relative to later improvements. The current work
follows Chang (1995) in assuming that ex ante licensing does not occur but seeks to ex-
plore how optimal patent breadth for a good with given social value changes depending
on the legal cost allocation regime. The differentiated duopoly setting provides a good
theoretical contrast to the homogenous good and vertical differentiation models used
in previous studies. In contrast to Green and Scotchmer (1995), I find that perfectly
broad patents are optimal only if R&D costs are sufficiently high.
The analysis of fee-shifting systems stems from seminal papers by Posner (1973) and
Shavell (1982) and explores the effect of legal cost allocation on filing, spending and
settlement of litigation. Spier (2007) provides a useful survey of the related works,
outlining general findings that the English rule encourages higher legal spending, as
the private costs are partially externalized, though there are no predictions on how
the individual litigants’ spending changes across the systems. The effect of the cost
allocation rule on settlement is ambiguous: the higher level of legal costs associated
with the English rule may increase the incentive to settle as parties will wish to avoid
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these costs (Hause (1989)) or may reduce the incentive to settle, as there is greater
scope for disagreement (asymmetries now exist not only over who will win, but also
who will pay). There also exists a small empirical legal literature focussing on the
effect of litigation cost allocation on legal fees. The theoretical literature does not
produce a clear prediction on which rule should yield higher observed fees, as even if
the English rule is predicted to increase legal spending, the indeterminacy of incidence
of settlement make prediction unclear: if the English rule decreases the incidence of
settlement higher legal spending should be observed, but if it increases the incidence of
settlement, then no (higher) fees will be observed. Empirical studies confirm that the
English rule is associated with higher spending on litigation but, like theoretical works,
have produced unclear results about the overall impact of the rule on total filings
(Kritzer (2002) provides a useful survey, Eisenberg and Miller (2010) more recently
looks at fee shifting preferences of public companies). Theoretical models of fee shifting
do not, however, operationalize the choice of patent breadth, generally adopting a
probability of infringement which is either exogenous or which depends exclusively
on legal spending. Aoki and Hu (1999), closest to the current work, compares patent
litigation and settlement outcomes for homogeneous good duopolists in Nash bargaining
under both rules. They find that the English rule is better for innovating firms when
the patent-legal system favors patentees. The current paper contributes by explicitly
illustrating the link between strategic behavior in respect of litigation spending and
policymakers’ choice of patent breadth. I find that, if R&D costs are sufficiently low,
policymakers may craft a more pro-patentee environment under the American rule
without jeopardizing investment or later generation development.
3.3. The Model
3.3.1. Model Setup
Firm 1 (‘F1’), the innovating firm, may choose to invest an amount C and develop a
basic innovation, over which it is awarded a patent. From this basic innovation the
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firm develops an application, which is defined as a practical use of the basic innovation
embodied in a commercial product. In biotechnology terms, for example, a basic inno-
vation would be an isolated or purified human gene, while applications would comprise
products derived from that particular gene, such as drug therapies, hormone treatments
based on chemicals manufactured by the gene or used to up- or down-regulate the gene
and diagnostic tests incorporating comparisons with the chemical composition of the
gene.
Conditional on the initial investment and application development by F1, firm 2
(‘F2’), the later entrant firm, may choose - with or without a license - to produce
another application deriving from the basic innovation for the market. The goods are
differentiated, with the degree of substitutability given by γ.
Utility Following Singh and Vives (1984), representative consumer utility is given by





2 − 2γq1q2), (3.1)
where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The degree of substitutability, γ, reflects the closeness of the
application products: if γ = 0, the products are independent and the firms are local
monopolists; if γ = 1, the goods are perfect substitutes. The consumer maximizes this
utility subject to a budget constraint of the form R = p1q1 + p2q2. Inverse demands
are given by pi = 1− qi − γqj .
Firms In the applications market, firms compete in prices to maximize profit given
by Πi = (pi − ci)qi where qi denotes the demand faced by firm i and ci denotes the
marginal cost to firm i, assumed to be zero throughout. The patentee firm may license
its patent to the entrant. Licensing is by Nash bargaining. The firms split any surplus
available according to the proportions (α, 1 − α), where α ∈ [0, 1] denotes the portion
of the surplus appropriated by the patentee. If α = 1, then, the patentee firm has full
bargaining power in the licence negotiations. Market payoff to each firm is composed
of market profit plus (or minus) licensing revenues (or fees paid).
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Firms do not have access to external financing or to reserves and must meet any and
all expenses out of market revenues. This assumption, while restrictive, helps to focus
the analysis, illustrating how litigation cost allocation regimes combine with patent
policy to affect the profitability of R&D investments. It is also arguably relevant to
small, startup biotechnology firms, which are often credit-constrained.
The Courts and Litigation If the entrant firm produces without a license, F1 may sue
for infringement, though to do so it must incur a cost L1 > 0 for litigation-related (or,
more generally, legal) expenses. The alleged infringer must also incur a cost, denoted
L2 > 0, to defend itself. The Courts find in favor of the patentee with probability δ.
Litigation renders the alleged infringer vulnerable to damages2 claims. I assume that
if the entrant firm is found to infringe the patent held by firm 1, the Courts require
the former to disgorge all profits earned by use of the protected innovation. This is
consistent with the unjust enrichment damages regime, one of the two major liability
rules used in the US. In practice, it is used regularly as it is both easier to understand
and to calculate than the principal alternative, the ‘lost profit’ regime, which requires
estimation of the effect of entry by the infringer on both prices charged and quantity
sold by the first stage firm.
Patents and the Patent Office I wish to focus on the issue of patent breadth, not
strength, and as such abstract from any issue of weak patents. As such, all patents
are valid (that is, all patents granted satisfy the requirements in respect of novelty,
non-obviousness and/or usefulness).
Patent breadth refers to how different a product has to be from the protected one in
order to be found infringing. This is determined primarily through the language used
in the claims of the patent document, which describe the form and use of the subject
matter being protected. In general, then, narrow patents will have claims which are
2Damages are defined as monetary compensation awarded to a wronged party. If F2 is found to
infringe the patent held by F1, any sum it is forced to transfer to the patentee may be interpreted
as damages.
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more explicit than those in broad patents. The Patent Office controls breadth as it
determines what language is acceptable in the patent filing.
The patentee’s probability of prevailing is determined by both the inherent merits of
the case and its strategic choice of litigation spending. Specifically, the probability of
infringement, δ, is given by:






The first term may be interpreted as the inherent merit of the case for infringement:
this depends only the closeness of the products and cannot be influenced by spending
on legal services. The second term denotes the portion of the patentee’s likelihood of
prevailing that is sensitive to legal spending.
The policy parameter λ ∈ [0, Λ] reflects the breadth of the patent. If λ > 0, the
patent claims are equivocal and may be interpreted as extending beyond inherently
similar goods. Thus, by spending more on legal services (increasing L1), the innovator
may present a compelling case to the Courts for why a broad substitute may infringe its
patent. Note that in the extreme case of local monopolies, there is no inherent merit to
the case, though with positive patent breadth the patentee may still prevail if it spends
enough on legal services. On the other hand, if the goods are perfect substitutes then
the patentee will win solely on the merits, even with minimal spending.
If the applications are imperfect substitutes, or if γ ∈ (0, 1), low λ implies that
F1’s probability of winning is more dependent on the nature of the goods (patents
are narrow). In the extreme case, λ = 0 would imply that the patent is as narrowly
crafted as possible, so that only a perfect substitute is found to infringe with certainty.
I term such patents perfectly narrow patents. Conversely, a higher value of λ means
that the patentee’s overall probability of prevailing depends more heavily on how much
the patentee commits to spending: if F1 spends enough, even a good with low substi-
tutability may be found to infringe with high probability (patents are broad). At the
extreme, if λ = Λ = L1+L2L1 , any potential substitute will be found to infringe. I term
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such a patent perfectly broad. The effects of λ on the probability of infringement are
shown in Figure 1. This specification for the legal technology is similar to that Plott
Figure 3.1.: Patent breadth and the Probability of Infringement
(1987)3 and is realistic in that if the patent is granted with sufficiently broad scope
that the Courts must apply discretion (that is, if claims are equivocal or patents have
positive breadth) then increased input of legal services may positively influence the
Court’s decision (larger legal team, greater detail in discovery, etc. allow a patentee
to craft a more comprehensive or more convincing complaint). This specification fur-
ther implies that increased spending is less useful the more substitutable are the goods:
close substitutes are inherently more likely to be found to infringe with a relatively high
probability, even if the firm did not spend anything on legal services. A patentee with
an inherently ‘good’ case thus does not have to spend heavily. By contrast, spending
on legal services is more useful if the patentee faces a more dissimilar application (that
is, the patentee has a relatively ‘weak’ case) as increased (or increased quality) legal
services may significantly increase the chance of a positive judgement.
The Patent Office (‘PO’) wishes to maximize social welfare, measured by total util-
ity (or total potential surplus): SW = U(q1, q2). But accomplishing this goal requires
3This specification used in Plott (1987) also includes a ratio of patentee spending to total legal
spending, but in the current model the inherent merits depend on closeness of the good. This
model is therefore able to provide additional insight into how the identity of a rival impacts a firm’s
incentive to spend on legal services. Another innovation of this model’s specification is that legal
spending only matters to the extent that patent breadth is positive.
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considering two often competing issues. Firstly, the PO must maximize the incentives
for investment in basic innovations, since without this first step no applications can be
brought to market. Secondly, though, the PO must also provide incentives for later
stage entrant firms to invest, as social welfare is increasing in the output of both appli-
cations. In setting patent breadth, the PO will attempt to find the maximum patent
breadth that would allow for investment and production by F1 while also allowing for
production by F2. This will maximize social welfare. However if no such patent breadth
exists, the best the PO can do is to maximize the innovator’s incentives to invest by
setting patent breadths to the highest possible level.
Timing The sequence of the game is presented in Figure 2. In the first stage, the
Patent Office decides on the patent breadth. In the second stage, F1 must decide, given
λ, whether to invest a sunk amount C to develop its idea into a patentable product. If
it invests, F1 is awarded a patent on the basic innovation and the claimed application.
If F1 does not invest, no innovation is possible and the game ends. Conditional on
investment by F1, in the third stage F2 costlessly develops a separate application
deriving from F1’s basic innovation. F1 decides if to offer a license and F2 decides
whether to produce without a licence from F1. If F2 does not produce without a
licence, F1 operates as a monopolist in the applications market. If the firms fail to
successfully conclude an agreement but F2 offers its product without a license, then in
the fourth stage F1 may file suit for infringement, at which time firms simultaneously
choose litigation spending levels, L1 > 0 and L2 > 0, respectively. In the fifth stage,
the Courts rule. F1 prevails with probability δ and on judgement F2 is called upon to
transfer all of its market profits to F1.
There is complete information. Given this sequence of events, F2 must either face
the patentee in licensing or in litigation. Expected payoffs with litigation determine the
outside options in the bargain over a license, so that F1 can use the threat of litigation
to influence the rival’s decisions.
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Figure 3.2.: Sequence of the game
3.4. Solving the Model
3.4.1. Firms’ decisions
At the final stage4 if no license has been agreed it falls to the Courts to adjudicate
between the parties. Courts rule in favor of F1 with probability δ. In the penultimate
stage, then, firms may perfectly anticipate their payoffs. If firms compete in prices in
the applications market, each makes profits equal to:
πd = π1 = π2 =
1− γ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
. (3.3)
Expected payoffs are given by each firm’s market profit adjusted for expected dam-
ages received or paid, as relevant, net of litigation spending. Both the probability of
infringement and the chosen litigation spend depend on the cost allocation regime, so
4If firms agree a license then each receives payoffs as per that agreement. However I begin with an
explanation of the no licensing outcome as this sets the disagreement point for any licensing bargain.
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that expected payoffs for the firms under each rule are:
American Rule =




E(ΠUS2 ) = (1− γ − λ(1− γ) L1L1+L2 )πd − L2
and
English Rule =
 E(ΠUK1 ) = (1 + γ + λ(1− γ)
L1
L1+L2
)πd − (1− γ − λ(1− γ) L1L1+L2 )(L1 + L2),




In the prior stage, firms consider licensing. If F2 would not enter without a license,
F1 could refuse to offer one and produce as a monopolist. In this case, the surplus
available in bargaining is the increase in joint profit from expansion in the market:
S1 = Πj −Πm. F1 must weigh the benefit from licensing (the portion of the surplus it
is able to appropriate, αS1) against the cost (allowing competition into the applications
market). In fact, F1 only ever finds it preferable to offer a license if production by the
entrant firm expands the applications market and it can appropriate a sufficiently large
share of any surplus generated. In the best case scenario for the patentee (when α = 1)
joint duopoly profit exceeds monopoly profit only if γ < 0.6117. Thus, if F2 would not
enter without a license, then even with full bargaining power the patentee will never
offer a license if γ ≥ 0.6117.
If F2 would produce without a license, then F1 could never prevent its entry into the
applications market by simply refusing to license. Even absent agreement between the
firms, the market would be a duopoly. However licensing would allow firms to avoid
costly litigation. The surplus available in bargaining then reflects the legal cost savings:
S2 = L1 + L2. The patentee would therefore be prepared to offer a license regardless
of the closeness of the rival’s good, meaning that licenses may be concluded over the
full range of γ.
If F2 would enter without a license, its expected licensing payoff under American
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1− γ − λ(1− γ) L1
L1 + L2
)










1− α− γ − λ(1− γ) L1
L1 + L2
)
(L1 + L2) (3.5)
The firm will produce as long as this expected licensing payoff is positive. By analogous






1 + γ + λ(1− γ) L1
L1 + L2
)











1− α− γ − λ(1− γ) L1
L1 + L2
)
(L1 + L2)(L1 + L2)
(3.7)
and will invest if and only if the expected licensing payoff is greater than or equal to
its fixed R&D cost, C. If F2 produces without a license, both do better to license.
3.4.2. The Patent Office’s decision
At the first stage, the PO chooses patent breadth, λ. I confirm that the PO strictly






while if both firms operate, each produces q1 = q2 = 1(2−γ)(1+γ) and social welfare is
SWd =
3− 2γ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
. (3.9)
Welfare is unambiguously higher with a downstream duopoly. The PO is aware that
if patents are sufficiently broad that F2 would not enter without a license, such an
agreement is concluded - and duopoly in the market results - if and only if the entrant’s
good is sufficiently dissimilar.
On the other hand, if patents are sufficiently narrow that F2 would enter without
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a license, F1 would be willing to offer a license to entrants over a broader range of γ.
Thus, if the PO wishes to allow maximum incentives for investment and duopoly in the
applications market it should to select λ such that both firms would be active in the no
licensing outcome. This will encourage firms to bargain, avoiding costly litigation, over
the largest possible range of γ. Because patent breadth affects the firms in opposing
ways - the patentee’s payoff is increasing in λ while the entrant’s payoff is decreasing in
λ - then patent breadths that allow for non-negative outside options for both firms must
be simultaneously large enough to make investment by F1 worthwhile and small enough
to make later entry profitable. I refer to this as the feasible range. The minimum of the
feasible range is the lowest patent breadth necessary for investment by the patentee if no
license is agreed; the maximum is the largest patent breadth that will allow the entrant
firm to earn a non-negative expected payoff in the absence of a license. Inasmuch as
the PO wishes to provide maximum incentives for investment, I posit that its preferred
patent breadth will be the maximum of this well-defined range.
If the feasible range is empty, meaning that there is no conceivable way to ensure
both investment by F1 and production by F2 without a license, the PO will do best to
allow for perfectly broad patents. This will maximize the probability of investment by
F1, the crucial step without which no product will reach the market. Further, it will
allow for some licensing: as I show in the section above, the patentee will license to the
entrant if such entry sufficiently enlarges the joint profit.
I next turn to comparing the outcomes under the different cost sharing rules.
3.4.3. The American or ‘Each Party Pays’ Rule
Under the American rule, each party pays its own legal costs, regardless of the Court’s
decision. In the no licensing case the firms simultaneously choose litigation levels to
maximize individual expected payoffs, taking spending by the other as given. Each





4(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
(3.10)
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(see Appendix). As may be expected, if each enjoys the same market profit and
chooses its litigation spending independently of the rival, the firms choose the same
level of spending. Given such values, the expression for the probability of infringement
simplifies to:
δUS = γ − 1
2
(−1 + γ)λ. (3.11)
Substituting these expressions for litigation spend and infringement probability into
the expressions for firms’ expected payoffs assuming no licensing yields:
E(ΠUS1 ) =
(−1 + γ)(−4 + γ(−4 + λ)− λ)
4(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
E(ΠUS2 ) = −
(−1 + γ)2(−4 + 3λ)
4(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
. (3.12)
As is explained above, the PO prefers to set patent breadth at the maximum of
the feasible range. I define λUS and λUS as the required minimum and maximum
patent breadths, respectively, bounding the feasible range. These threshold values are
computed by setting the relevant firm’s no licensing payoff equal to its investment cost
and solving for λ, which yields the following:
Remark 3.1 If there is no licensing agreement, then under the American rule, the
minimum patent breadth required for investment by the patentee, λUS, is:
0 if 0 < C ≤ 0.25 and γ ∈ [0, γ1);
4(1 + γ)(−1 + C(−2 + γ)2 + γ)
(−1 + γ)2 if

0 < C ≤ 0.03303 and γ ∈ (γ1, γ̄2)
0.03303 < C ≤ 0.25 and γ ∈ (γ1, γ̄3)
0.25 < C ≤ 0.3125 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ̄3




+ −1+4C2C and γ̄2 and γ̄3 are the third and first roots, respectively,
of the expression (−3 + 8C + 2γ + (1− 6C)γ2 + 2Cγ3).
The maximum patent breadth that allows a later entrant to operate is λUS = 43 .
I next consider whether the feasible range is non-empty. The maximum patent breadth
for which F2 will enter without a license, λUS , is constant, reflecting the fact that its
choice of legal spending is independent of the patentee’s spending.
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The minimum patent breadth required for investment by F1 is increasing in C, as
may be expected. Interestingly, it is non-monotonic in γ, first falling and then rising,
for low R&D costs. The intuition is that if R&D costs are low, then the patentee will
operate with perfectly narrow patents if the entrant’s product is either very dissimilar
or highly substitutable. In the former case, the entrant expands the market and price
competition is very weak. In the latter case, the applications are so similar that the
patentee would prevail in Court with very high probability even with λ = 0. For a
range of moderately substitutable goods, positive patent protection is required. This
is because goods are close enough that competition compresses prices, but not close
enough that expected damages compensate for the reduction in profit.
For moderate to high R&D costs, however, the closeness of the entrant’s product
becomes more important. The range of substitutes that the patentee is able to tolerate5
with perfectly narrow patents is lower. For high costs, the patentee will always require
a strictly positive patent breadth and will only operate if the rival’s good is sufficiently
dissimilar.
The maximum feasible patent breadth, λUS is independent of γ, while the minimum
feasible patent breadth, λUS , is increasing in the degree of closeness between the ap-
plications as R&D costs increase; thus the range of γ over which the feasible range
of patent breadths is non-empty narrows as R&D costs increase. Recalling that with
maximum patent breadths the best case scenario (if F1 has full bargaining power) as-
sures licensing only if γ < 0.6117, when does the PO do better to select λUS rather
than Λ? Comparing the outcomes under each:
Remark 3.2 Under the American rule, the Patent Office ensures investment by F1
and duopoly production over a greater range of entrant applications by setting λ = λUS
than by setting perfectly broad patents if and only if C ≤ 0.218.
Proof : See Appendix.
5‘Tolerance’ here describes whether or not the firm is able to enjoy non-negative expected payoff if its
rival is active in the market.
77
The PO’s feasible range is large if R&D costs are low, as the patentee finds it profitable
to invest even with very limited patent protection. If F1 faces higher R&D costs, how-
ever, the firm is less able to tolerate close competitors and will require more protection.
For sufficiently high investment costs, the feasible range is empty and the PO will do
better to set patent breadth to its maximal level: in this way, the patentee has an
incentive to offer a license whenever the entrant’s application sufficiently expands the
overall market. Thus the model implies that for low to moderate R&D costs, imperfect
patents are preferable. Only for sufficiently high investment costs are results consistent
with Green and Scotchmer (1995) in recommending perfectly broad patents.
3.4.4. The English or ‘Losing Party Pays’ Rule
Under the English Rule, the losing party pays all litigation costs; a firm’s spending
thus depends on patent breadth and on the spending of its rival. If firm 1 sues for




(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(1 + (−1 + γ)λ)2
LUK2 =
(−1 + γ)3(−1 + λ)λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(1 + (−1 + γ)λ)2
(3.13)
(see Appendix). Consistent with much of the literature, then, the English rule here
leads to greater total litigation spending than the American rule for a given patent
breadth. In this setup, I can also analyze more closely the spending incentives of each
firm. The English rule suggests that for a given strictly positive patent breadth, the
patentee spends considerably more (less) on litigation than the entrant firm if the goods
are close (far) substitutes. This is because the the extent to which one unit of spending
on legal services by F1 increases the probability of infringement (the marginal benefit
of litigation spending to the patentee) is greater than the extent to which one unit of
spending by F2 reduces the probability of infringement (the marginal benefit to the
entrant) for close substitutes: if F1 has a good case, spending a bit more on legal
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services helps to support it; at the same time, F2 knows its own case is weak and
spending a bit more in defense does not enhance it very much. These incentives are of
course reversed for low substitutability
The probability of infringement is given by:
δUK =
γ
1 + (−1 + γ)λ
(3.14)
Substituting for litigation spending levels and probability of infringement in the ex-
pressions for expected payoffs yields:
E(ΠUK1 ) = −
−1 + γ2 + 3(−1 + γ)2λ+ 2(−1 + γ)3λ2
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(1 + (−1 + γ)λ)2
E(ΠUK2 ) = −
(−1 + γ)2(−1 + λ(2 + (−1 + γ)λ))
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(1 + (−1 + γ)λ)2
. (3.15)
Denote by λUK and λUK the required minimum and maximum patent breadths, re-
spectively, of the feasible range under the English rule:
Remark 3.3 If there is no licensing agreement, then the minimum patent breadth re-
quired for investment by the patentee under the English rule, λUK , is given by:













 0 < C ≤ 0.25 and γ ∈ (γ1, γ̃2)0.25 < C ≤ 0.3125 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ̃2
where A = 2(−1 + γ) + C(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ) and γ̃2 is the first root of the expression
(−2 + 4C + 2γ − 3Cγ2 + Cγ3).
The maximum patent breadth that allows a later entrant to operate is given by λUK =
1









Unlike under the American rule, the maximum patent breadth that allows F2 to operate
now depends on the degree of substitutability between the goods. This is because firms
operating under a ‘loser pays’ principle partially externalize their legal spending. And
since legal spending is driven to a great degree by the closeness of the rival’s product,
each firm is affected more intensely by the identity of its rival, reflected in γ. Indeed,
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if goods are moderately close (γ < 12(3 −
√
5)), firms are sufficiently aggressive in
their legal spending that the PO moves to cap patent breadth. It is clear that λUK
is decreasing in the closeness of the goods, meaning that the rival is able to operate
profitably with stronger patents only if it produces a more dissimilar good.
Under the English rule, then, λUK is non-decreasing in γ (strictly increasing for
γ ∈ [12(3−
√
5), 1]) and λUK is decreasing in γ as R&D costs rise: thus here again the
feasible range narrows as C increases. Comparing the range of γ for which the feasible
range of patent breadths is non-empty if the PO selects λUK rather than Λ:
Remark 3.4 Under the English rule, the Patent Office ensures investment by F1 and
duopoly over a greater range of entrant applications by setting λ = λUK rather than by
setting perfectly broad patents if and only if C ≤ 0.215.
Proof : See Appendix.
The recommendation here mirrors that under the American rule: the PO does better
to set moderately broad rather than perfectly broad patents if R&D costs are low to
moderate. By doing so, they ensure that the welfare-superior licensing outcome is
realized for a wider range of entrant firms. If R&D costs are high, however, then the
best way to maximize the probability of investment by early innovating firms is to set
perfectly broad patents.
3.4.5. Comparison of Patent Breadths under the American and English
Rules when C ≤ 0.215
I have so far shown the boundary values for the feasible range under each rule, along
with setting out the R&D cost requirements for the relevant feasible ranges to be non-
empty. If such costs are sufficiently high, then the PO will set perfectly broad patents
regardless of the cost allocation rule in force. If C ≤ 0.215, however, the PO’s preferred
patent breadths under the respective cost allocation rules are λUS and λUK . In this
sub-section, I examine the implications of the cost allocation rule for policy, and so fix
R&D costs at a level which would lead to rule-specific patent breadths. I examine the
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impact of the specific rule on (i) patent breadth, (ii) legal spending by firms and (iii)
the overall probability of infringement.
First, compare the relative patent breadths. Given the PO’s choice of λUS and λUK
under respective rules, it follows that:
Proposition 3.1 If C ≤ 0.215, the Patent Office’s preferred patent breadth is lower
(that is, patents are narrower) under the English rule.
The PO selects the highest possible patent breadth which allows later stage firms to
enter the market. The American rule allows for broader patents because firms consider
only their own costs when deciding how much to spend. Under the English rule,
however, firms must consider the rival’s spending as well as its own. As a result, each
firm’s incentive to spend increases with patent breadth. If the PO were to set λ at
a high level, this would set off an arms race in legal spending - F1 would increase its
spending to increase the overall probability of infringement, while F2 in turn would
raise its spending to counteract the patentee’s efforts. The negative externalities firms
impose on each other via legal spending are strong enough to lead to an explosion in
spending. This is consistent with the discussion in Plott (1987) about the instability
of the English rule, though in the current specification this occurs only if patents are
sufficiently broad.
The model suggests that, all else equal, if R&D costs are sufficiently low, policymak-
ers operating with the American rule will maintain broader patents than those under
the English rule, even while the different systems result in equal levels of innovation
and activity by later stage entrants. Broader American patents therefore do not nec-
essarily prejudice innovation and neither are they per se symptoms of a pro-patentee
Patent Office; rather, they reflect the effects of the legal cost allocation mechanism.
A corollary of this policy implication would be that any attempt to narrow patents
without expressly addressing the effects of the fee-shifting regime - in the manner of
the recent Leahy-Smith America Invests Act - may have adverse effects on investment
and innovation.
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Now turn to the legal spending under the respective rules. Substituting λUS for
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Proposition 3.2 If C ≤ 0.215 and the Patent Office sets patent breadth at its rule-
specific preferred level, patentee firms spend more under the English rule than under the
American rule if goods are sufficiently similar, while entrant firms always spend more
under the English rule relative to the American rule. Total litigation spending is always
higher under the English rule than under the American rule.
Given the PO’s preferred patent breadths, the English rule leads to greater total liti-
gation spending. Firm spending is shown in Figure 3.3. The patentee will spend more
on legal services if operating under the English rule than it will under the American
rule only if the degree of substitutability between the applications is sufficiently high,
though its spending decreases as good become more similar and its case is inherently
stronger. Note that the entrant firm always spends more on litigation under the En-
glish rule relative to the American rule, but for low substitutability the entrant spends
considerably more than the patentee, bolstering its already strong defense. The entrant
firm will spend less on legal services than the patentee if it produces a sufficiently close
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Figure 3.3.: Comparison: Legal Spending if C ≤ 0.215
substitute, both because pricing pressure is higher (it has less to spend) and because
the marginal benefit of spending on an inherently weaker case is low.
I have shown that the American rule results in stronger patents, but that the English
rule induces more legal spending. What, then, is the effect on the overall probability
of infringement? Substituting for legal spending and preferred patent breadths under



















In spite of the fact that the English rule induces higher legal spending by both firms,
it is the American system that results in the larger overall probability of infringement.
Proposition 3.3 If C ≤ 0.215 and the Patent Office sets patent breadth at its rule-
specific preferred level, the overall probability of infringement is higher under the Amer-
ican rule than under the English rule.
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Figure 3.4.: Comparison: Probability of Infringement if C ≤ 0.215
The intuition is that under the English rule, the PO will set narrower patents. If
patents are narrow, it is the intrinsic differences between the applications that more
heavily affect the Court’s decision; thus even with high levels of legal spending (better
lawyers, more detailed discovery, etc), the patentee’s chance of a favorable judgement
is not markedly enhanced. The probability of infringement under the respective rules
is illustrated in Figure 3.4. This overall result implies that for given R&D cost levels
and closeness of application products, it is the American rule of legal cost allocation
that is better for the patentee. Importantly, however, the system is more pro-patentee
not because of any inherent bias in the Patent Office, but as an intrinsic feature of the
legal cost allocation. The firms are able to de-couple their legal spending decisions,
which allows the PO to set broader patents. The English system, in forcing the firms
to think about the rival’s spending, sets the scene for an arms race in legal spending.
This leads the PO to set low patent breadths.
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3.4.6. Comparison of Patent Breadths under the American and English
Rules when C > 0.215
I now turn to analysis of the implications of the cost rules for patent policy if C > 0.215.
I have shown above that the PO does better to set patent breadth at the rule-specific
level if C ≤ 0.218 under the American rule, while the same is only true under the
English rule if C ≤ 0.215. Thus, for R&D costs in the range 0.215 < C ≤ 0.218, a PO
operating in a system with the English rule of legal cost allocation will set perfectly
broad patents while a PO operating with the American rule will do better to set patent
breadth at λUS .
Comparing the overall probability of infringement under the respective rules for such
cost levels:
Proposition 3.4 If 0.215 < C ≤ 0.218, the Patent Office’s preferred patent breadth is
lower (that is, patents are narrower) under the American rule.
This is illustrated in Figure 3.5. For R&D costs in this range, investment by the
patentee requires that either the rival sells a sufficiently dissimilar good or that expected
damages are sufficiently high. Under the English rule, however, high patent breadth
drives both firms to spend heavily. This in turn means duopoly cannot be sustained if
goods are close substitutes (pricing competition is high and firms are driven to spend
more on legal services; both of these factors mean that expected payoffs decline). A
PO operating under the English rule may therefore do better to set perfectly broad
patent breadths, as this encourages investment while still providing for at least some
licensing.
If C > 0.218, the PO will find it preferable to set perfectly broad patents under either
rule.
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Figure 3.5.: Comparison: Probability of Infringement if 0.215 < C ≤ 0.218
3.5. Concluding Remarks
Patent design in the context of sequential innovation is a balancing act between ensuring
that patentee rights are strong enough to enable R&D investment yet weak enough
that future development is not impeded. Licensing and investment behaviour are also
impacted by the method used to allocate legal costs. Thus, effective patent policy
must consider not only patent breadth and the level of litigation cost but also how
these costs are split across firms. This paper has compared R&D investment and
patent licensing outcomes for the American and English rules of legal cost allocation
in a highly stylized setting, assuming complete information, one-period duopoly and
licensing by Nash bargaining. Caution is therefore advised in any interpretation of
results.
Nevertheless, it provides interesting insight into the relationship between the nature
of the fee-shifting regime and licensing incentives. I have shown that, all else equal, if
R&D costs are sufficiently low, American policymakers may maintain a greater degree
of patent breadth and allow a higher probability of infringement of patents than would
be the case under the English rule. As such, the US patent system may indeed appear
to be more patentee-friendly than systems elsewhere. However this does not necessarily
prejudice later entrants and is due to the fee-shifting system itself, not any inherent
pro-patentee bias at the Patent Office. However if R&D costs are moderate, it is
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the English rule which may induce broader patents. An important corollary of model
results is that any attempt to narrow patents without expressly addressing R&D costs
and the fee-shifting regime may mean that patentees may no longer find it profitable
to invest. Results further suggest that if R&D is sufficiently expensive, then perfectly
broad patents should be adopted regardless of the cost allocation rule.
There are several interesting avenues for further research, including expanding com-
petition to a greater number of applications and exploring the effects of the rule on
optimal patent breadth if both insider- and outsider-patented inputs are essential for
production.
A. Appendix
A.1. American rule: Choice of Litigation Spending
If both firms operate in the applications market and F2 does not license, payoffs to F1
and F2, respectively, are given by:
E(Π1) =
(















(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
)
− L2 (3.A.1)
Each firm will simultaneously choose its legal spending to maximize its payoff. This
yields 2 possible solutions for L1, given by:
L11 = −
L2(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ) +
√
L2(1 + γ)(2 + (−3 + γ)γ)2λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
L12 =
−L2(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ) +
√
L2(1 + γ)(2 + (−3 + γ)γ)2λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ) (3.A.2)
and 2 possible solutions for L2:
L21 = −
L1(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ) +
√
L1(1 + γ)(2 + (−3 + γ)γ)2λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
L22 =
−L1(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ) +
√
L1(1 + γ)(2 + (−3 + γ)γ)2λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ) (3.A.3)
Simultaneous solution yields four pairs of expressions, but the only pair that yields
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non-negative expressions for both are given in the text at (3.10). Total litigation costs
are:
(−1 + γ)2λ
2(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
(3.A.4)
A.2. American rule: Feasible Range of Patent Breadths
To find the feasible range, I look for the range of parameters for which λUS ≤ λUS .
This is the case if and only if:
• 0 < C ≤ 0.0330309 and γ < γ̂2
• 0.0330309 < C ≤ 0.0620499 and γ < γ̂2
• 0.0620499 < C < 0.25 and γ < γ̂3
where γ̂2 and γ̂3 are the third and first roots of the expression (−4 + 12C + 2γ + (2 −
9C)γ2 + 3Cγ3). Note that γ̄2 > γ̂2 and γ̄3 > γ̂3 for all relevant values of C.
In order to evaluate when the PO does better to choose λUS or maximal patent
breadth, I consider the range of substitutes that will be granted a license. With perfectly
broad patents, if it has full bargaining power - and is therefore most likely to license -
the patentee will grant a license only if γ < 0.611709. Note that γ̂2 > 0.611709 ∀ 0 <
C ≤ 0.0620499; if R&D costs are low, the PO does better to set patent breadths
according to λUS . I next note that γ̂3 > 0.611709 only if C ≤ 0.217642; only if R&D is
very costly is it better for the PO to set perfectly broad patents.
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A.3. English rule: Choice of Litigation Spending

























(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)
)
− (L1 + L2)
(3.A.5)
if F1 files suit, each firm will simultaneously choose its legal spending to maximize its
payoff. This yields 2 possible solutions for L1, given by:
L11 = −
L2(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(−1 + λ) +
√
L2(−2 + γ)2(−1 + γ2)(−1 + λ)λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(−1 + λ)
L12 =
−L2(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(−1 + λ) +
√
L2(−2 + γ)2(−1 + γ2)(−1 + λ)λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ)(−1 + λ)
(3.A.6)
and 2 possible solutions for L2:
L21 = −
L1(−2 + γ)2γ(1 + γ) +
√
L1γ(1 + γ)(2 + (−3 + γ)γ)2λ
(−2 + γ)2γ(1 + γ)
L22 =
−L1(−2 + γ)2γ(1 + γ) +
√
L1γ(1 + γ)(2 + (−3 + γ)γ)2λ
(−2 + γ)2γ(1 + γ)
(3.A.7)
Simultaneous solution yields four pairs of expressions, but the only pair that yields
non-negative expressions for both are given in the text at (3.13). Total litigation costs
are:
(−1 + γ)2λ
(−2 + γ)2(1 + γ + (−1 + γ2)λ)
, (3.A.8)
which is greater than spending under the American Rule, given at (3.A.4), ∀λ > 0.
A.4. English rule: Feasible Range of Patent Breadths
I wish to find the range of parameters for which the feasible range is non-empty, or
λUK ≤ λUK , under the English rule. This is the case if and only if:
• 0 < C ≤ 0.236068 and γ1 < γ < ˆ̂γ2
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• 0.236068 < C ≤ 0.238534 and ˆ̂γ1 < γ < ˆ̂γ2
where ˆ̂γ1 and ˆ̂γ2 are the first and second roots respectively, of the expression (−1+(11−
24C + 16C2)γ + (−19 + 24C)γ2 + (9 + 18C − 24C2)γ3 + (−24C + 8C2)γ4 + (6C + 9C2)γ5 −
6C2γ6 + C2γ7). Note that ˆ̂γ1 ≥ γ1 and ˆ̂γ2 < γ̃2 and for all relevant values of C.
In order to evaluate when the PO does better to choose λUK or maximal patent
breadth, I consider the range of substitutes that will be granted a license. Recall that
with perfectly broad patents, the patentee will grant a license to all γ > 0.611709. Note
that ˆ̂γ2 > 0.611709 ∀ 0 < C ≤ 0.215177. Thus for all R&D costs below this level, the
PO can ensure licensing over a larger range of substitute applications if it sets patent
breadth at λUK rather than allowing for perfectly broad patents. The PO switches to
perfectly broad patents at a lower investment cost level under the English rule than
under the American rule.
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4. Spinning out of an Anticommons:
Licensing and Vertical Separation in
Differentiated Duopoly
Abstract
The potential for an Anticommons, an underuse of early stage research tools
to produce valuable, complex final products, is a source of much concern among
policymakers and legal scholars, especially in the US. In spite of the mixed empirical
evidence, policymakers have recently legislated to weaken patents in an effort to
ensure that later-stage development is not impeded. I use a simple, one-period
differentiated duopoly model to show that if the holder of the single essential
patent has flexibility in corporate structure and if products are of equal quality,
Anticommons problems are eliminated, while if later-stage products are of higher
quality, the likelihood of such problems is reduced. If the patentee holds 1 of
2 essential patents, the ability to shift its corporate structure may reduce total
licensing costs to rival firms. However while vertical separation by the patentee
may help to sustain downstream competition, it may reduce welfare. Thus the
inefficiency may be in the opposite direction to the one currently thought - there
may be too much technology transfer, rather than too little.
Keywords: Patent Licensing, Anticommons, Vertical Separation, Complementary
Inputs
JEL Classifications: D43, D45, L13, L22
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4.1. Introduction
In highly sequential industries such as biotechnology and genomics, R&D inputs (pre-
vious generation products and research tools) are virtually impossible to invent around,
leading firms to seek intellectual property right (‘IPR’) protection and to defend IPRs
at above-average levels. Fears about the power of patentees over the direction and
speed of potentially much more valuable later stage innovation has led many in the US
to argue that patent rights are too strong (Jaffe and Lerner (2004)). Policymakers are
moving to respond to these concerns with increased legislation, the latest of which is
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, signed into law on September 16, 2011.1 This
law includes, inter alia, a broader scope for prior art, additional support to defendants
in infringement claims and revised post-examination processes, all in an attempt to
dilute protection to patentees.
However, much of the theoretical work on which concerns about the adverse effects of
patentee power are based assumes that the industrial relationship of patent owners and
licensees is fixed; that is, most models assume the patentee is either a co-competitor in
the final goods market (an insider) or an input provider which does not produce (an
outsider). In reality, patentees may change corporate structure, transforming them-
selves from outsiders to insiders or vice versa. Such changes in corporate structure
have direct implications for patentees’ incentives to license to non-patentholding com-
petitors and, as such, for the likelihood that later stage innovators will be kept out of
the market.
Using a simple differentiated duopoly model based on Singh and Vives (1984), I ex-
amine the potential for an Anticommons, defined as failure of a firm to secure all licenses
necessary for production where such production is welfare enhancing (typically deriving
from either blocking or stacking problems), if vertically integrated patentees are able to
dis-integrate. Such vertical separation allows the patentee to commit to charging down-
stream entities uniform license royalties. I show that in this model, where production
1This law was the outcome of repeated attempts at patent reform and follows on from similar proposals
in 2005, 2007 and 2009, when Bills failed to make it to floor vote.
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by a second downstream firm is always welfare-enhancing, Anticommons problems will
not occur if the products are of equal quality and the patentee holds the only patent
essential for production, as that firm will always license to its downstream rival, simply
shifting its corporate structure depending on the identity of the competitor. If the rival
offers higher quality, Anticommons problems occur only if goods are sufficiently close
substitutes. If the patentee owns only 1 of 2 essential inputs, vertical separation may
reduce total royalty payments for rival firms. Results therefore suggest that, rather
than seeking to foreclose rivals in the downstream market, early stage patentees may
instead choose vertical structures which preserve downstream competition. The model
thus suggests that concerns about the strength of upstream patents may be somewhat
exaggerated, as potential Anticommons may be greatly reduced provided that patent
owners have flexibility in corporate structuring.
However I find that this preservation of downstream competition may be at the
expense of welfare. Indeed, for certain parameter ranges there may be too much tech-
nology transfer rather than too little. If the patentee controls the single essential patent,
vertical separation is welfare reducing if the rival does not offer a significantly higher
quality. If the patentee controls only 1 of 2 essential patents, with the second owned by
an outsider, whenever vertical separation is employed it is welfare reducing. Thus, an
Anticommons result may be welfare-superior to downstream duopoly. Consequently,
the more serious issue for policymakers, given that such divestitures do not normally
require permission from competition authorities, is that welfare reducing vertical sep-
aration may be observed.
I focus on the case of a vertically integrated patentee which has the option to vertically
separate, or to spinoff its research/IPR unit as this setup seems to more closely mirror
the concerns of legal and policy scholars that powerful insider firms can use intellectual
property rights to foreclose rivals and retard later-generation products. Further, spinoffs
are a major feature of the biotechnology landscape: parent companies often spin off
specific IP assets into separate companies to allow management to focus on core assets
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or facilitate external financing. In the vein of Adams and Mukherji (1999), I define
a spinoff as a transfer by a ‘parent’ company of some specific portion of its assets,
technology, property and/or personnel into a separate legal entity, the shares of which
are distributed to the owners of the parent company by means of a dividend. The owners
of the parent company are not required to relinquish any of their existing holdings in
exchange for this dividend, meaning that after the spinoff they hold shares in the two
distinct companies.
Such a change in corporate structure may be costly, especially in respect of taxes, as
distributions to shareholders in the form of a dividend typically attract capital gains
taxes. The US Internal Revenue Service permits tax-free treatment of spinoff share
distributions only if the transaction meets certain standards, the most stringent of
which is the independent business purpose test.2 At the current time, spinoffs which
simply maximize shareholder value (along the lines of the spinoffs in this model) do not
meet the test. The model therefore suggests that if policymakers prioritize downstream
licensing over static welfare, this type of tax-free treatment should be extended to
spinoffs which result in higher levels of technology licensing.
4.2. Related Literature
This paper is related to two strands of literature: (i) complementary monopoly and the
tragedy of the anticommons; and (ii) vertical separation theory.
Complementary monopoly refers to a case where participation by multiple rights-
holders is required for production of a final good to take place. If participation is not
secured, there is a social loss as valuable final goods are not produced, an outcome
which is termed the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’. This could occur because final
stage firms control none of the rights essential to production of a good, needing to in-
license from other firms which cannot co-ordinate pricing (fragmentation in upstream
property rights or stacking) or because a firm faces controls only some, but not all of the
2These standards are laid out in the Internal Revenue Code §355. Adams and Mukherji (1999)
provides an in-depth discussion.
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essential rights (it faces blocking patents). A relatively recent anticommons literature
has emerged since the term was coined in Heller and Eisenberg (1998). Llanes and
Trento (2009) looks at probability of innovation (market entry) where a firm faces
multiple patentee input suppliers, finding that innovation cost increases (decreases) as
products become more complex if inputs are complements (substitutes). Anticommons
effects therefore may be realized where products are complex and inputs are essential or
difficult to substitute. However Cheng and Nahm (2007), (2010) show that such effects
are more likely to arise only if individual components have no/ little value relative to
the value of the final good. Though some scholars simply posit that competition in
components will solve this problem (Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2006)), further work
has shown that this may not be sufficient if all sectors are not competitive (Casadesus-
Masanell et al. (2009), Alvisi and Carbonara (2010)).
The continued debate over the ability of first generation patentees to block rivals
and create anticommons-type problems has led to calls from the legal academe (Mire-
les (2004), Barnett (2000)) for some combination of (i) weakening patent rights; (ii)
adoption of relaxed antitrust supervision of research joint ventures and patent pools;
and/or (iii) more aggressive antitrust policy outside of such collective arrangements
(with merger control more driven by concerns about innovation markets, to keep patents
rights relatively diffused), a discussion which has doubtless influenced the recent Amer-
ica Invents Act. However there have also been counter-arguments, principally Lichtman
(2006) which suggests that if downstream revenue does not depend on the number of
individual components to be assembled and component owners know the overall num-
ber of components required, then each should be more willing to settle as the number
of components increases.
This lack of theoretical consensus is matched by mixed results in US industry studies
on the question of a biotechnology anticommons. Walsh et al. (2003) finds that while
there has been increased patenting activity on research tools in the biomedical sector,
there is only limited evidence that drug discovery has been ‘substantially impeded’.
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But Merz et al. (2002), Cho et al. (2003) and Gaisser and Hopkins (2009) contradict
these findings, reporting anticommons-type effects in the diagnostic testing market
as surveys of clinical geneticists indicate that they are dissuaded from developing or
offering diagnostic tests where underlying patents are in force. Recent empirical papers
also seem to support the presence of a ‘scientific’ anticommons: Murray and Stern
(2007) compares biotechnology patent-paper pairs and finds that the flow of knowledge
(as captured by citations) drops 10 - 20% after a patent is granted, with the effect
greater over time and for public researcher papers. A similar work, Huang and Murray
(2008) finds that flow of knowledge (again captured by follow-on publications) relating
to human gene-based patent-paper pairs declines significantly after grant of the patent,
with this decline increased for, inter alia, private-sector ownership, broad scope and
commercial importance of the gene.
The question of vertical separation and market foreclosure has also been well ex-
plored. Notable works include Bonanno and Vickers (1988), which shows that vertical
separation is better for firms if they can use franchise fees to extract profit from down-
stream and Cyrenne (1994), which shows that firms will separate upstream and down-
stream functions under Bertrand competition if the downstream goods are sufficiently
close substitutes and downstream firms pay a per unit fee. Rey and Tirole (2007)
provides a useful survey or work in this area and sets out conditions under which an
integrated entity would prefer to divest its downstream operation. In their model, the
entity faces 1 upstream rival and a downstream rival, with downstream firms making
an irreversible choice of upstream supplier. They show that if downstream goods are
sufficiently close substitutes, the pure downstream rival is more concerned about fore-
closure and has an incentive to choose the alternate upstream supplier. The integrated
entity may therefore choose to divest its downstream operation so as to avoid loss of a
downstream customer. Reisinger and Tarantino (2011) looks at complementary input
producers each facing competition from less efficient sources and facing homogeneous
downstream duopoly, and concludes that vertical integration may lead to lower in-
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put prices as the integrated entity reduces input prices when its corporate structure
changes.
This paper draws on each of the aforementioned streams and contributes to a smaller
literature on the competitive and welfare effects of strategic choice of vertical structure
with patent ownership. Matsushima and Mizuno (2009) and Laussel and VanLong
(2011) look at, respectively, static and dynamic choices of vertical separation by a
downstream monopolist if multiple inputs are required for production, concluding that
separation may lower input prices to the monopolist. This paper contributes by ex-
tending the question to downstream duopoly where the firm also licenses to its rival.
This setup allows us to explore a tradeoff that is not present in the monopoly setup:
integration allows the firm to use the per-unit license to benefit its own competitive
potion, but separation forces the outsider patentee to offer a lower royalty.
Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) examines a patentee’s incentives to license a cost-
reducing innovation to a differentiated rival and concludes that licensing by royalty is
welfare reducing only if firms compete in prices, the goods are close substitutes and the
innovation is large but not drastic. I look at the case of a product innovation, which is
qualitatively similar to a drastic cost innovation, and so extend this result.
Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2006), the paper closest to this work, explores choices fac-
ing an upstream patentee research laboratory which supplies its cost-reducing technol-
ogy to downstream duopolist manufacturers and shows that when upstream patentees
choose two-part tariff licensing, they merge with one of the downstream firms if prod-
ucts are sufficiently close substitutes. Such mergers are both profitable and welfare
enhancing if the innovation is small. This paper looks at a related but distinct ques-
tion: the optimal corporate structure and licensing strategy for an initially vertically
integrated patentee facing differentiated competition in the downstream market and
licensing by per-unit royalty. This setup allows us to analyze the potential for powerful
insiders to foreclose rivals and retard later-generation products. It is also a distinct
policy question from the case of an upstream research laboratory since in the latter
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case, any welfare reducing merger could simply be blocked by competition authorities
whereas spin-offs require no such permission. As a result, any welfare reducing out-
comes cannot be prevented. The current model contributes in two further ways. Firstly,
I examine this question both when the patented input is the only essential input and
when it is only 1 of 2 essential inputs, allowing for an analysis of stacking. Second, I
allow for demand asymmetry in the downstream products, so that I can address the
impact of early IPR on relatively more valuable later stage innovation. I find that if
only 1 patent is required, the Sandonis and Fauli-Oller (2006) policy recommendation
to block any profitable merger is appropriate only if the rival does not offer signifi-
cantly higher quality, as vertical integration (effectively, a merger) is both profitable
and welfare enhancing if the quality differential is sufficiently large.
4.3. Model Setup
Firm 1 (the patentee firm) is an integrated firm consisting of an upstream research
division and a downstream manufacturing division. Via its upstream unit, firm 1 holds
the patent on an input, component A, which is essential for downstream production.
The patent granted on the input is perfect. Firm 1 may, at no cost, vertically sepa-
rate. Under separation, the spun-off research entity would deal with the downstream
production unit on an arms length basis, although both would remain part of the same
business group or consortium. Firm 1’s downstream division faces competition from
Firm 2 (the entrant firm) which operates downstream only, having no research capacity.
Firm 2 makes use of the patented Component A to produce a differentiated final good.
Consumers A continuum of consumers with mass equal to 1 have utility given by





2 + 2γq1q2), (4.1)
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where γ ∈ [−1, 1] and a ≥ 1.3 Consumers maximize this utility subject to a budget
constraint of the form R = p1q1 + p2q2. Social welfare is measured by total utility (or
total potential surplus): SW = U(q1, q2).
Firms The producers compete in prices, with firm 1’s downstream unit and firm 2
facing inverse demands given by p1 = 1− q1 − γq2 and p2 = a− q2 − γq1, respectively.
The parameter a reflects the asymmetry in the quality or social value of the goods: if
a = 1 (a > 1), the quality of good 1 is equal to (lower than) that of good 2. The degree
of product differentiation is given by γ: if γ > 0, the goods are substitutes; the closer is
γ to 1, the more substitutable the goods. If γ = 0, the goods are independent and each
firm is a local monopolist. If on the other hand γ < 0, the goods are complements. In
what follows, I consider only independent and substitute goods, and therefore restrict
that γ ∈ [0, 1].
Each downstream firm requires access to all essential research tools if it is to be
active in the market. If a producer is unable to conclude a successful licensing agree-
ment with any of the patentees, it is unable to produce and its rival may be left as a
monopolist in the downstream market. Such a failure to agree has a negative effect on
social welfare, which is increasing in the production of both goods. I formally define
an Anticommons (or an Anticommons problem) as the failure by either downstream
firm to secure the essential patents for production when such production is welfare en-
hancing. Anticommons problems may arise either because the patentees are not willing
to license (this may be termed the blocking effect: patentees may assert the patents
to successfully block production by rivals and secure their own competitive positions)
or because parties are unable to come to terms (typically due to the stacking effect:
patentees negotiate with producers individually and the sum of the individual license
fees makes production unprofitable).
3This corresponds to the Singh and Vives (1984) model with α1 = β = 1 and α2 = a× α1.
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Figure 4.1.: Timing of the game
Timing The timing of the game, summarized in Figure 4.1, is as follows: in the first
stage, firm 1 decides whether to remain vertically integrated or to spin off its upstream
R&D unit. In the second stage, patentee firms decide whether to offer a license to the
downstream firms and if so, announce the royalty(ies), simultaneously where applicable,
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In the third stage, all downstream licensees compete in
prices in the downstream market.
4.4. The Model with One Essential Input
First suppose that component A is the only input required for production of the final
(downstream) good. Production technology is such that 1 unit of component A is
needed to manufacture 1 unit of the final good. The industry structure is illustrated
by Figure 4.2. A vertically integrated firm 1 provides the input to its downstream
Figure 4.2.: The model with 1 essential input
division and decides whether to license to the rival or to operate as a downstream
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monopolist. The upstream unit of a vertically separated firm 1 could license to one
or to both downstream operators, though consortium profits would equal the sum of
firm 1’s upstream and downstream profits. A license is characterized by a non-negative
per-unit royalty payment, rA. In this case, only 1 input is required so the stacking issue
does not apply. My analysis of the likelihood of an Anticommons therefore focusses on
potential blocking by the patentee.
A fully vertically integrated firm 1 could in theory offer component A to its down-
stream arm at a transfer price anywhere between cost and the price at which it licenses
to firm 2. Unless the firm’s transfer price announcement is enforceable, however, it
faces a commitment problem if it announces any price other than the cost price, zero.4
I proceed assuming that such announcements are not enforceable, so that vertical in-
tegration implies that firm 1’s downstream unit accesses component A without cost.5
4.4.1. Vertical Integration
At the final stage, if firm 1 is a downstream monopolist, it earns a profit of π1,m = 14 .
If instead firm 2 operates as a downstream monopolist, it must in-license component
A. In that scenario, firm 1, the patentee, enjoys licensing revenue of π1,m = a
2
8 and the
downstream monopolist makes a profit, net of licensing costs, of π2,m = a
2
16 . If, however,
there is a downstream duopoly, firm 1 has marginal cost of zero (it owns the required
patent) while firm 2 has a per unit input cost equal to rA, the per unit royalty charged
by firm 1 for component A. Optimal prices and quantities are given by:
p1 = 1 +
−8 + 5γ2 + aγ(−2 + γ2)
2(8− 7γ2 + γ4)
; p2 = a+
(a+ γ)(−2 + γ2)
2(8− 7γ2 + γ4)
π1 =
−8 + 11γ2 − 4γ4 − a2(−2 + γ2)2 + a(8γ − 6γ3)
4(−1 + γ2)(8− 7γ2 + γ4)
; π2 = −
(−4γ + 3γ3 + a(−2 + γ2)2)2
4(−1 + γ2)(8− 7γ2 + γ4)
(4.2)
4If the rival were to price assuming per-unit costs to firm 1 equal to the announced transfer price, then
the integrated firm has an incentive to lower the actual transfer price below this level and partially
foreclose its rival.
5Relaxing this assumption would simply change the interpretation of model results. If announced
transfer prices were enforceable, what I term ‘vertical integration’ would translate to firm 1 setting
a transfer price equal to upstream marginal cost and what I term ‘vertical separation’ would translate
to firm 1 setting a uniform downstream royalty. The model would therefore lay out the effect of the
firms’s transfer pricing strategy on the possibility of an Anticommons.
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and the per-unit royalty charged by firm 1 is:
rA =
−γ3 + a(8− 8γ2 + γ4)
2(8− 7γ2 + γ4)
(4.3)
(see Appendix). The royalty is decreasing in the degree of substitutability, γ, and
increasing in the social value of firm 2’s product, a. Note that if the entrant firm pro-
duces a more valuable product, duopoly is only possible if the degree of substitutability
between the products is sufficiently low; if the degree of substitutability exceeds the
critical threshold, goods are almost homogenous and consumers prefer the rival’s higher
quality good. The patentee is unable to attract positive demand and will therefore only
earn licensing revenue.
By comparison of the patentee’s potential earnings across the different scenarios, I
establish the patentee’s licensing behaviour. In deciding whether to offer a license to
firm 2, firm 1 must weigh the licensing revenue it can receive against the increased
competitive pressure it will face. Summarizing:
Remark 4.1 If a vertically integrated firm 1 owns the only essential patent reading on
downstream production and licenses via a per-unit royalty, then the patentee will refuse
a license (an Anticommons result) if and only if (a) 1 ≤ a ≤ 1.01975 and either (i)
γ ∈ (γ1, γ2) or (ii) γ > γ̃1 or (b) 1.01975 < a ≤
√
2 and either (i) γ ∈ (γ1, γ2) or (ii)
γ > γ̃2, where:
γ1 and γ2 are the third and fourth roots, respectively, of the expression(
4a2 − 8aγ + (4− 4a2)γ2 + 6aγ3 + (−4 + a2)γ4 + γ6
)
; γ̃1 is the third root of the expression(
4a− 4γ − 4aγ2 + 3γ3 + aγ4
)
; and γ̃2 is the third root of the expression(
8− 2aγ − 9γ2 + aγ3 + 2γ4
)
.
No Anticommons occurs if a >
√
2.
Proof : See Appendix.
The intuition is the following: for low enough demand asymmetry (that is, if 1 ≤
a ≤
√
2), the patentee firm compares the profit from operating as a downstream mo-
nopolist to that earned from licensing and competing in downstream duopoly. If the
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goods are sufficiently different, competitive pressure is weak and joint profit high so
that licensing revenue exceeds any losses from increased competition. If goods are mod-
erately substitutable, however, competitive pressure is strong enough to compress firm
1’s downstream earnings and the level of the per unit license, but not strong enough
that the rival can take advantage of the higher value attached to its product. Licens-
ing is therefore not a profitable choice and the patentee will assert its patent to block
production by firm 2: Anticommons problems thus result for this range of γ. If goods
are moderate-to-high substitutes, the entrant firm, by dint of its higher quality, is able
to capture more of the market and licensing is again preferable for firm 1 as in this
way it can appropriate some portion of firm 2’s profit. For the closest substitutes, as is
explained above, the patentee will not attract positive demand. It does better to block
the entrant and produce as a downstream monopolist; Anticommons problems occur.
However, if the entrant’s quality is sufficiently high, that is, if a >
√
2, the patentee
will always license to the rival firm 2; no Anticommons will result. The patentee rather
decides whether it should maintain its downstream operation or allow the licensee firm 2
to operate as a monopolist, and operates downstream only if it can generate sufficiently
high market revenues.
4.4.2. Vertical Separation
Let us now suppose that at stage 1, firm 1 spins off its (upstream) research unit.
Recall that under vertical separation, the upstream entity offers arms-length, per-unit
royalty contracts to either one or both downstream operators. If it contracts with both
downstream firms, then, they access component A at the same per-unit cost, rA.
If the upstream entity sells only to the consortium’s downstream operation, then
upstream unit sets a per-unit royalty of rAu =
1
2 and makes licensing revenue of πu,m =
1
8 . Downstream profit, net of licensing costs, is πd,m =
1
16 and consortium profit is
πc,m = 316 . If instead the consortium’s patent-holding upstream unit offers a license
only to firm 2, the outcome will be as in the comparable case under vertical integration:
firm 2 earns a profit, net of licensing costs, of π2,m = a
2
16 . The patentee makes licensing
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revenue of πu = a
2
8 . If the research unit sells to both downstream producers, optimal
downstream prices and profits are given by:
p1,vs =
−2− 14 (1 + a)(2 + γ) + γ(a+ γ)
(−4 + γ2)
; p2,vs =




(6 + γ − 3γ2 + a(−2 + (−3 + γ)γ))2
16(−4 + γ2)2(−1 + γ2)
; π2,vs = −
(−2 + (−3 + γ)γ + a(6 + γ − 3γ2))2
16(−4 + γ2)2(−1 + γ2)
(4.4)




; πu = −
(1 + a)2
8(−2 + γ)(1 + γ)
. (4.5)
(see Appendix). The royalty is increasing in the entrant’s quality, a, but is independent
of the degree of substitutability, γ. Note that duopoly is only possible if the quality
differential is not too large and the degree of substitutability between the products is
sufficiently low.
The upstream unit always does better to offer a license to the entrant firm. Thus, if
firm 1 opts for vertical separation, blocking does not arise: no Anticommons exists. But
the firm will only make such a choice if consortium payoffs under vertical separation
exceed payoffs under vertical integration. I next examine when the firm will opt to spin
off its research unit, comparing vertically integrated profit to consortium profit under
vertical separation:
Proposition 4.1 If firm 1 owns the single essential patent reading on downstream
production and licenses via per-unit royalty, then if vertical separation is possible,
• if a = 1, the patentee will always always provide a license to the entrant and no
Anticommons occurs;
• if 1 < a < 1.30395, the patentee will provide licenses to rivals over a larger range
of γ than is possible if it could not dis-integrate; the option to separate therefore
means Anticommons outcomes are less likely; and
• if a > 1.30395, the patentee’s licensing behaviour does not change.
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Proof : See Appendix.
Thus the option of vertical separation helps to reduce the blocking effect for some
parameter values. The intuition here is that with the elimination of double marginal-
ization under vertical integration, the downstream unit of firm 1 faces a marginal cost
of zero and the rival firm, taking this into account, prices more aggressively. By spin-
ning off the research unit, the conglomerate can credibly raise the marginal cost facing
its downstream unit, raising the price charged by the rival firm as well. The benefit
associated with this less aggressive pricing is more important the stronger is the pricing
pressure - that is, the lower is the quality differential and the more substitutable are
the goods.
In the special case of symmetric quality, consortium profit exceeds vertically inte-
grated profit if γ > 0.629 and γ̃3 = 1. Firm 1 will remain integrated and license to
the rival if γ is low and will spin off the upstream research unit and license to both
downstream producers if γ is high. The model suggests that as the degree of substi-
tutability increases, firm 1 will switch from a regime where it is vertically integrated
and licensing to its rival, to vertical separation where it licenses to both downstream
units. The option of vertical separation therefore preserves downstream competition
over the entire range of γ. For any degree of substitutability, then, the patentee will
never block entry. No Anticommons exists.
For larger values of a, however, the entrant firm is able to capture more of the market;
the patentee thus has more to lose from downstream competition and licensing becomes
a less attractive strategy. This means there will be some blocking, though the ability
to spin off upstream units makes this outcome less likely.
The change in firm 1’s licensing behaviour resulting when it has the option to verti-
cally separate is shown in the figures below. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 are drawn assuming
a = 1, while Figures 4.5 and 4.6 are drawn assuming a = 1.25. While there is no
stacking issue per se - only 1 input is required for consumption - it is interesting to
explore what effect this switch in corporate structure may have on the licensing cost to
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Figure 4.3.: No Vertical Separation, a=1
Figure 4.4.: With Vertical Separation, a=1
entrants. Comparing the per unit royalty charged under integration with that under
separation:
Proposition 4.2 If firm 1 owns the single essential patent reading on downstream
production and licenses via a per-unit royalty, then vertical separation by firm 1 results
in a lower royalty to the downstream rival if and only if 1.33079 < a < 1.4439.
Proof: The patentee switches from remaining vertically integrated and licensing to its
rival at a per-unit royalty rA to vertically separating and licensing to both downstream
operators at a per unit royalty rAvs only if (i) 1 ≤ a ≤ 1.42933 and γ ∈ [γ̆1, γ̃3] or (ii)
1.42933 < a < 1.91809 and γ ∈ [γ̆3, γ̃3]. For each specific range of γ, I check the relative
size of the per-unit royalties. For a as per (i) rA > rAvs only if a ∈ (1.33079, 1.42933].
For a as in (ii), rA > rAvs only if a ∈ (1.42933, 1.4439). 2
Figure 4.5.: No Vertical Separation, a=1.25
The standard result is that if products are symmetric in quality, vertical integration
by a patentee and a downstream supplier raises rivals’ costs; as such, vertical separation
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Figure 4.6.: With Vertical Separation, a=1.25
may be expected to lower rivals’ costs. However results here suggest that the rival
firm will benefit from a decrease in royalties only if the quality asymmetry lies in a
moderate range. The intuition is that while the royalty set by an outsider increases
in a and is independent of γ, the royalty charged by an insider patentee increases in
a to a larger extent, and decreases in γ. For low quality differentials, the latter effect
is more important: because the royalty set by a competitor-patentee is decreasing in
the closeness of the goods, a patentee with flexible corporate structure will rationally
dis-integrate only if it can charge more per unit (i.e., if the rival is sufficiently close).
Thus, separation always raises the rival’s cost. For moderate quality differentials, the
effect of a on the royalties is more pronounced; any separation will lower rivals’ costs.
For large quality differentials, the patentee will move to shut its downstream operations
entirely, so that its corporate structure has no bearing on royalty levels.
4.4.3. Welfare
Let us now consider the welfare implications of firm 1’s corporate structure. First,
assume that the firm remains vertically integrated. If firm 1 operates as a monopolist,
welfare is equal to Um where:










































In contrast, welfare with a downstream duopoly is given by:
Ud =
1
8(−1 + γ2)(8− 7γ2 + γ4)2
[
192− 384γ2 + 267γ4 − 76γ6 + 8γ8 + a2(−2 + γ2)2
(28− 25γ2 + 4γ4) + 2aγ(−3 + 2γ2)(32 + 5γ2(−6 + γ2))
]
(4.8)
and by straightforward comparison of this and the foregoing utility expressions, I note
that Ud exceeds utility under either form of monopoly for all permitted values of γ. As
such, any refusal to license is welfare reducing.
Now suppose that firm 1 is vertically separated. Total utility with a separated firm
1 and downstream duopoly is given by:
Ud,vs =
1
16(−4 + γ2)2(−1 + γ2)
[
− 76 + γ(−16 + γ(57 + (7− 12γ)γ)) + a(40 + 2γ(48+
(−5 + γ)γ(3 + 4γ))) + a2(−76 + γ(−16 + γ(57 + (7− 12γ)γ)))
]
(4.9)
By comparison of this expression to Ud, it is straightforward that welfare is unambigu-
ously improved with a vertically separated patentee only if the quality associated with
the entrant’s product is sufficiently high, specifically:
Proposition 4.3 If firm 1 owns the single essential patent reading on downstream
production and licenses via a per-unit royalty, vertical separation is welfare enhancing
if and only if 1.549 < a < 3 and γ ≤ γ̃3.
Proof : See Appendix.
If the quality differential is smaller than this, whenever the firm chooses to spin off the
upstream unit, welfare is reduced. This is because the patentee is able to use royalty
licensing to soften downstream competition; the effect is to restrict downstream out-
put. Even though the ability to vertically separate and use royalty licensing preserves
downstream competition, such a strategy lowers welfare. To the extent that the rival
product has a sufficiently higher quality, however, preservation of downstream compe-
tition enhances welfare, as production of the high quality good compensates for the
increased input prices.
This result is consistent with Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002), but the current model
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contributes by showing that (i) the intuition holds for the case of a product innovation,
which is conceptually similar to a drastic cost innovation and therefore that an inte-
grated firm may opt to divest its downstream arm and license to both manufacturers
even when it could fully foreclose and (ii) vertical separation may be welfare enhanc-
ing even with partial foreclosure if the rival firm produces a differentiated good with
sufficiently higher quality.
4.5. The Model with Two Essential Inputs
As the number of essential inputs required for a given final good increases, producers
face both the blocking and stacking problems. This is especially true of the biotech-
nology sector, where fragmented ownership of genetic material means that a producer
often has to assemble an array of research tools if it is to operate. In order to analyze
the effect of choice of corporate structure on downstream production when there ex-
ists a stacking issue in research tools, I now vary the setup slightly and consider the
model with two essential inputs and three firms. Firm 1 is (again) an integrated firm
consisting of an upstream research division and a downstream manufacturing division.
Via its upstream unit, the firm holds the patent on an input, component A, which
is one of two inputs essential for downstream production. Firm B is an independent
upstream firm producing component B, the second input required for production. It
has no downstream capability. Production technology is such that 1 unit each of com-
ponents A and B are required for production of 1 unit of the downstream good. There
are no marginal costs of production in the upstream units and the patents granted on
the inputs are again assumed to be perfect.
Downstream, firm 1 faces competition from firm 2, which produces a differentiated
substitute. The downstream firms compete in prices to maximize profit. The industry
structure is summarized in Figure 4.7. The timing mirrors that described in the model
with 1 essential patent: in the first stage, firm 1 decides whether to remain vertically
integrated or to spin off its upstream R&D unit. In the second stage, patentee firms
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Figure 4.7.: The model with 2 essential inputs
decide whether to offer a license to the downstream firms and if so, announce licensing
fees simultaneously, with licenses offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In the third
stage, all downstream licensees compete in prices in the downstream market. As in the
section above, I first consider the scenario in which firm 1 remains vertically integrated,
and then turn to the outcomes under vertical separation.
4.5.1. Vertical Integration
Under vertical integration, firm 1’s downstream unit accesses component A at no cost.
At the final stage, if firm 1 operates as a monopolist, in-licensing only component
B, it will pay a license fee equal to rB1,m = 12 and make a profit (net of royalties) of
q1,m = 116 . Firm B makes a profit of πB1,m =
1
8 . If instead firm 2 is a monopolist,
it must in-license both components. The patentees, setting royalties simultaneously,
will charge rA2,m = rB2,m = a3 . Firm 2 will produce q2,m =
a
6 and make a profit
(net of royalties) of π2m = a
2
36 . The patentees each make licensing revenue equal to
πA2,m = πB2,m = a
2
18 . Firm 1 therefore prefers to sell to a monopolist firm 2 (rather





If instead both producers successfully agree licenses for the required inputs, firms
choose prices to maximize market profits. In the previous stage, the integrated firm 1
chooses rA to maximize its total payoff, composed of licensing revenue and downstream
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Figure 4.8.: Reaction Functions with Vertically Integrated Firm 1
profits, while firm B chooses rB to maximize licensing revenue. The firms set royalties
according to (see Appendix):
rA =
8a+ γ3 − rB(8 + γ3)
2(8 + γ2)
; rB =
1 + a− rA − rAγ
4
(4.10)
Each upstream firm’s royalty is decreasing in its rival’s, as the individual royalties are
strategic substitutes. The per-unit royalty charged by the insider firm is increasing in
γ, the degree of substitutability, consistent with the previous literature. For relatively
close substitutes, the insider attempts to use the royalty as a collusive device to ease
price competition. However the royalty charged by the outsider is decreasing in the
degree of substitutability, as the outsider must react to the increased pricing pressure
downstream. The firms’ reaction functions are shown in Figure 4.8, which is drawn
assuming γ = 0.5.
Substituting and solving for the per-unit royalties in terms of model parameters:
rA =
8− 3γ3 + a(−24 + γ3)
−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2))
; rB =
−16− 2a(−2 + γ)2 + γ2(−2 + γ + γ2)
−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2))
(4.11)
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If the entrant offers the same quality (a = 1), the per-unit royalty charged by the
insider firm is lower than that charged by the outsider over the relevant ranges of γ.
This is because, notwithstanding the fact that royalties are increasing in substitutability
of the goods, the insider internalizes the effect of royalties on downstream profits. The
outsider is able to leverage on the insider’s greater sensitivity to downstream market
conditions to charge a higher royalty. In the case of asymmetric quality, the per-unit
royalty charged by the insider (outsider) is increasing (decreasing) in a. Where products
are highly quality-asymmetric, then, the insider patentee sets a per-unit royalty rate
higher than that of the outsider.
The optimal prices and profits are given as:
p1 =
−36 + 6γ + γ4 + a(−4 + γ(−2 + (−2 + γ)γ))
−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2))
p2 =
−4 + γ(10 + γ(−2 + 3γ)) + a(−44 + γ(6− 6γ + γ3))
−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2))
π2 =
(2 + γ2)2(−2 + (−5 + γ)γ + a(6 + γ − γ2))2
(−1 + γ2)(−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2)))2
πB = −
2(−2 + γ)(8− 2a(−2 + γ) + γ(4 + γ(3 + γ)))2
(1 + γ)(−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2)))2
π1,d =
1
(−1 + γ2)(−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2)))2
[
(−20 + γ(6− (−2 + γ)γ)+
a(4− 10γ + γ3))(20 + a(−4− 14γ − γ3 + γ4) + γ(2 + γ(−2 + γ − 3γ2)))
]
(4.12)
(see Appendix). The total payoff to firm 1 is given by πC = π1,d + rAq2.
By comparing firm 1’s payoffs under each of the three scenarios, I establish its licens-
ing behaviour6:
Remark 4.2 If firm 1 owns 1 of 2 essential patents (or sets of essential patents) that
read on downstream production and patentees license via a per-unit royalty, then the
firm will never refuse a license if a = 1. If 1 < a < a∗, firm 1 will refuse to license to
the entrant (an Anticommons result) if and only if γ > γ̂1. If a > a∗, firm 1 will never
refuse a license.
Proof : See Appendix.
6It is straightforward that firm B, the outsider patentee, always prefers to offer licenses as this is
its only source of revenue. For analysis of the blocking issue, then, it suffices to examine firm 1’s
licensing behaviour.
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The intuition is that licensing is more profitable to the innovating firm 1 the larger is the
market-expanding effect of the rival’s good (that is, the lower is γ) and its downstream
operation is able to enjoy a higher market share the smaller is the quality differential
(that is, the lower is a). There thus exists only a small range of substitutability over
which the patentee firm would block production by a rival.
4.5.2. Vertical Separation
Let us now suppose that at stage 1 firm 1 spins off its upstream research unit into a
separate entity. As in the model with 1 essential input, the newly independent research
unit deals with the downstream production unit on an arms length basis, providing
component A to both downstream producers at a per-unit royalty rA, though it remains
part of the same consortium. The upstream unit is now an outsider patentee and will
therefore operate like firm B, the formal outsider.
At the final stage, both producers must now in-license both components. A down-
stream monopolist maximizes πm = (pm(rA, rB) − rA − rB) × qm(rA, rB). If firm 1’s




12 . If instead firm 1 offers a license only to firm 2, the outcome mirrors that with a
firm 2 monopoly in subsection 5.1: each patentee charges rAm = rBm = a3 ; the firm
2 produces qm = a6 and makes a profit (net of royalties) of πm =
a2
36 . The patentees
each make a profit of πum = πBm = a
2
18 from licensing. The consortium would prefer
to sell exclusively to its downstream arm rather than selling exclusively to the rival





If instead firm 1 offers licenses to both firms, the downstream duopolists maximize
πi = (pi(rA, rB , pj) − rA − rB) × qi(rA, rB , qj) (i 6= j). At the previous stage, patentees
simultaneously announce royalties, setting the per-unit charges at:
rAvs =
1 + a− 2rBvs
4
; rBvs =
1 + a− 2rAvs
4
. (4.13)
These reaction functions are compared with the reaction functions with vertical inte-
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Figure 4.9.: Comparison of Reaction Functions: Vertically Integrated vs. Separated Firm 1
gration in Figure 4.9 (again drawn assuming γ = 0.5).
The reaction function of firm 1 is only slightly displaced if it chooses to vertically
separate. Indeed, the major difference in royalties is observed because the outsider
patentee, firm B, changes its behaviour markedly if it faces another outsider patentee:
royalties are strategic substitutes, and with vertical separation firm 1 must now pay a
non-zero price for use of component A. As a result, firm B moderates its royalty. This
is shown by a downward rotation in the reaction function.
Solving for the royalties in terms of model parameters, I confirm that in vertical
separation, the patentees charge symmetric royalties:





Optimal prices and profits are given by:
p1V S =
8 + 2a+ γ − 2aγ − 3γ2
12− 3γ2
; p2V S = −




18(2− γ)(1 + γ)
; π2V S = −
(−2 + (−2 + γ)γ + a(4 + γ − 2γ2))2
9(−4 + γ2)2(−1 + γ2)
πcV S =
(4 + γ − 2γ2 + a(−2 + (−2 + γ)γ))2
9(−4 + γ2)2(1− γ2)
+
(1 + a)2
18(2− γ)(1 + γ)
. (4.15)
Downstream duopoly is only feasible if the markets sizes are sufficiently close and the














For (i) 1 < a < 2 and γ > γ̂3 or (ii) a > 2, the consortium’s downstream unit would
not be able to sustain positive output. For such parameter values, then, firm 2 would
function as a downstream monopoly.
I now turn to the question of firm 1’s choice of corporate structure. Note that
the upstream unit always prefers to sell to both downstream producers, so there is no
blocking. But γ̂1 > γ̂3 for the relevant range of a, meaning that the vertically separated
structure supports licensing over a narrower range of downstream substitutability than
vertical integration. Thus the option of vertical separation does not change the potential
for blocking of the rival.
I next investigate if vertical separation has any influence on the stacking effect. If
vertical separation is possible, firm 1 will opt to spin off the upstream unit only if the
goods are sufficiently dissimilar and the quality differential is sufficiently low. More
precisely:
Proposition 4.4 If firm 1 owns 1 of the 2 essential patents (or sets of essential
patents) that read on downstream production and licensing is by per-unit royalty, then
if vertical separation is possible, firm 1 will spin off its upstream unit and license to
both downstream producers if and only if 1 ≤ a ≤ 173(50 + 21
√
6) and 0 ≤ γ ≤ γ̃4. Such
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vertical separation has no effect on blocking but does reduce total royalty payments to
firm 2 (stacking).
Proof : See Appendix.
This result is the key contribution of this section. The patentee will only opt for vertical
separation if both a and γ are sufficiently low, so unlike in the model with one essential
input, the ability to shift its corporate structure does not reduce the likelihood that firm
1 will act to block its rival. However whenever firm 1 does spin off its upstream unit,
separation means reduced total royalty for its downstream rival: it reduces the stacking
effect. This increases the profit to the entrant, making an Anticommons problem less
likely.
The intuition is that because insider patentees are more sensitive to downstream pric-
ing than outsider patentees, vertical separation - which converts firm 1’s upstream unit
from an insider into an outsider - increases competition upstream. This is consistent
with Laussel (2008), Laussel and VanLong (2011) and Matsushima and Mizuno (2009)
though it extends those results to a setting with downstream duopoly. Separation by
firm 1 forces the outsider patentee to price less aggressively; for the rival firm, this
input cost reduction is substantial enough to compensate for the increased cost of the
input sold by the spin-off unit. The illustrated in Figures 4.10 and 4.11:
Figure 4.10.: No Vertical Separation, a=1.05
Figure 4.11.: With Vertical Separation, a=1.05
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Separation improves payoff to the consortium as even though the downstream op-
eration faces higher costs relative to the integrated case (it must now pay to access
component A), the upstream unit benefits from increased licensing revenue from the
rival firm (which produces more as its total royalty payments have declined). Separa-
tion here increases total profit to the consortium and entrant firms not because of any
collusive effect in the downstream market (firm 2 actually lowers its downstream price)
but because it inhibits expropriation by the outsider patentee.
4.5.3. Welfare
Welfare is unambiguously higher under downstream duopoly. However note that when
vertical separation does occur it is not welfare enhancing: welfare with a vertically
integrated patentee licensing to its rival is given by:
Ud,vi =
1
(−1 + γ2)(−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2)))2
[
− 912 + γ(48 + γ(−20 + γ
(−44 + γ(132 + γ(−14 + γ(2 + γ − 3γ2)))))) + a2(−592 + γ(16 + γ(−252 + γ(−16 + γ(34− (−1 + γ)
γ(−10 + γ2)))))) + 2a(160 + γ(560 + γ(−76 + γ(230 + γ(−72 + γ(15 + γ(−4 + (−4 + γ)γ)))))))
]
(4.17)
while welfare with vertical separation is given by:
Ud,vs =
1
18(−4 + γ2)2(−1 + γ2)
[
− 76 + 64a− 76a2 − 24(1 + (−4 + a)a)γ + 3(19+
a(−16 + 19a))γ2 + 2(5 + a(−17 + 5a))γ3 − 12(1 + (−1 + a)a)γ4
]
(4.18)
Straightforward comparison of (4.17) and (4.18) illustrates that in the relevant ranges
of a and γ, the increased output from firm 2 (resulting from the reduced input cost)
is insufficient to compensate for the reduction in output from the downstream unit of




The potential for an Anticommons, an underuse of early stage research tools and other
IPR to produce complex, valuable products, is a source of much concern among policy-
makers and legal scholars. It arises when downstream firms are unable to secure access
to vital inputs, typically due to either blocking or stacking problems. In spite of mixed
empirical evidence about the extent to which Anticommons problems are observed in
reality, US policymakers have recently moved, via the Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, to weaken patents in an effort to ensure that later-stage development is not im-
peded by upstream rights-holders. I use a simple, one-period differentiated duopoly
model to show that if patentees have flexibility in corporate structure, Anticommons
problems are greatly reduced. Indeed, the model suggests that if the patentee and
entrant firms offer symmetric qualities and the patentee holds rights to the single es-
sential input, Anticommons issues can be entirely eliminated. If instead the patentee
owns one of 2 essential IPR, vertical separation does not affect blocking but does reduce
the stacking problem to entrants. But while vertical separation by the patentee helps to
sustain downstream competition, it may reduce welfare. Thus, while policymakers are
concerned about inefficiencies associated with underuse of upstream research tools, the
true inefficiency may be in the opposite direction - there may be too much technology
transfer, rather than too little.
I recognize that given the assumptions embedded in the current specification, namely
complete information, absence of ex ante licensing and costless re-structuring, the re-
sults should be interpreted with a great deal of caution. However the model succeeds in
illustrating a case where policymakers’ worry of too little development may not just be
exaggerated but misguided as increasing downstream competition may harm welfare.
118
A. Appendix 1: The Model with One Essential Patent
A.1. Vertical Integration - Optimal prices and profits
If firm 1 is a downstream monopolist, it faces an inverse demand of p1,m = 1 − q1,m.
Since it holds the patent on component A, marginal costs downstream are zero. The
firm maximizes profit π1,m = p1,mq1,m by setting price equal to p1,m = 12 and produces
q1,m = 12 . Profit is thus π1,m =
1
4 .
If firm 2 operates as a downstream monopolist, it faces inverse demand of p2,m =
a − q2,m and must choose price to maximize profit of π2,m = (p2,m − rA) q2,m. It will
produce q2,m = a−rA2 . At the previous stage, the patentee firm chooses rA to maximize
its licensing profit, πA,m = rA × q2,m, and thus sets a per-unit royalty of rA2,m = a2 .
Substituting for rA in firm 2’s choices, firm 2 produces q2,m = a4 and earns a profit, net
of licensing costs, of π2,m = a
2
16 . The patentee enjoys licensing revenue of π1 =
a2
8 .
Comparing its profits in the alternate monopoly scenarios, it is clear that firm 1
therefore would prefer to license component A to a monopolist firm 2, rather than
operate as a monopolist itself, only if a >
√
2.
If instead there is a downstream duopoly at the final stage, firms face inverse demand
of the form p1 = 1− q1 − γq2 and p2 = a− q2 − γq1, respectively. Further, firm 1 has
a marginal cost of zero (it owns the required patent) while firm 2 has a marginal cost
equal to rA, the per unit royalty charged by firm 1 for component A. Optimal prices
and quantities with per unit licensing in terms of rA are given by:
p1 =
−2 + γ(a− rA + γ)
−4 + γ2
; p2 =
−2(a+ rA) + γ + aγ
−4 + γ2
q1 =
2− γ(a− rA + γ)
(4− γ2)(1− γ2)
; q2 = −
−2a+ 2rA + γ + (a− rA)γ2
(4− γ2)(1− γ2)
(4.A.1)
At the previous stage, firm 1 must choose rA considering both the effect on its own
as well as the rival’s downstream profits. It chooses the royalty to maximize π1 =
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p1(rA)× q1(rA) + rA × q2(rA), and sets the per-unit royalty at
rA =
−γ3 + a(8− 8γ2 + γ4)
2(8− 7γ2 + γ4)
. (4.A.2)
Substituting for rA into the final stage expressions, optimal downstream prices and
total firm profits may be expressed as:
p1 = 1 +
−8 + 5γ2 + aγ(−2 + γ2)
2(8− 7γ2 + γ4) ; p2 = a+
(a+ γ)(−2 + γ2)
2(8− 7γ2 + γ4)
π1 =
−8 + 11γ2 − 4γ4 − a2(−2 + γ2)2 + a(8γ − 6γ3)
4(−1 + γ2)(8− 7γ2 + γ4) ; π2 = −
(−4γ + 3γ3 + a(−2 + γ2)2)2
4(−1 + γ2)(8− 7γ2 + γ4) (4.A.3)
Note that such an outcome is not always feasible. More precisely, firm 1 prices and
output are only positive if the degree of substitutability between the downstream prod-
ucts is sufficiently low, or if γ < γ̃2, where γ̃2 is the third root of the expression(
8− 2aγ − 9γ2 + aγ3 + 2γ4
)
. Additionally, firm 2 prices and profits are only posi-
tive if either (i) a ∈ [1, 1.01975] and γ < γ̃1, where γ̃1 is the third root of the ex-
pression
(
4a− 4γ − 4aγ2 + 3γ3 + aγ4
)
; or (ii) a > 1.01975. Note that γ̃1 < γ̃2 ∀a ∈
[1, 1.01975]. Taking both sets of restrictions into account, then, duopoly is possible if
(i) a ∈ [1, 1.01975], γ ≤ γ̃1 or (ii) a > 1.01975 and γ < γ̃2.
A.2. Proof of Remark 4.1
If 1 ≤ a ≤
√
2, the patentee must decide between operating as a downstream monopolist
(refusing a license) and operating in downstream duopoly (licensing to the entrant). It
therefore compares monopoly profits of π1,m = 14 with duopoly payoff (market profits
plus licensing revenue). The latter is larger (so the patentee will license) if and only if:
• a ∈ [1, 1.01975] and either γ ≤ γ1 or γ ∈ [γ2, γ̃1), where γ1 and γ2 are the third
and fourth roots, respectively, of the expression(
4a2 − 8aγ + (4− 4a2)γ2 + 6aγ3 + (−4 + a2)γ4 + γ6
)
and γ̃1 is as in the previous sub-
section;
• a ∈ (1.01975,
√





2, the patentee always prefers selling to a monopolist entrant rather than
operating as a monopolist itself. Therefore whether or not there is duopoly down-
stream, firm 1 will always license: no Anticommons occurs. The patentee compares
its licensing revenue if selling to a monopolist, π1 = a
2
8 to its earnings (including
licensing revenue) from duopoly. The patentee will operate downstream only if (i)
a ∈ [
√
2, 1.45514] and γ < γ3 or γ ∈ [γ4, γ̃2]; or if (ii) a > 1.45514 and γ <
γ̃2, where γ3 and γ4 are the third and fourth roots, respectively, of the expression(
16− 16aγ + (−22 + 7a2)γ2 + 12aγ3 + (8− 6a2)γ4 + a2γ6
)
.
A.3. Vertical Separation - Optimal prices and profits
Let us now consider the case if at stage 1 firm 1 elected to spin off its upstream research
unit. Under vertical separation, the upstream entity will offer arms-length, per-unit
royalty contracts to either 1 or to both downstream operators.
If the upstream entity elects to sell to only 1 downstream firm, it may offer a license to
the consortium’s downstream operation or to firm 2. If it offers a license to the related
producer, that firm maximizes profit πd,m = (pd,m − rA)qd,m and will produce qd,m =
1−rA
2 , where the subscript d denotes that it is the downstream unit of the consortium.
At the previous stage, the upstream patentee unit chooses rA to maximize its licensing
profit, πu = Aqd,m, and thus sets a per-unit royalty of rAd,m = 12 . Substituting for rA
in the downstream firm’s choices, output becomes qd,m = 14 and downstream profit, net
of licensing costs, becomes πd,m = 116 . The patentee enjoys licensing revenue of πu =
1
8 .
Consortium profit is πd,m + πu = 316 .
If the patentee unit offer a license instead only to firm 2, the outcome will be as in
the comparable case under vertical integration: firm 2 produces q2,m = a4 and earns a
profit, net of licensing costs, of π2,m = a
2
16 . The patentee enjoys licensing revenue of
π2,m = a
2
8 . Thus, if the patentee wishes to offer only 1 license, it does better to license
to the rival firm 2 ∀ a > 1.22.
The upstream entity may of course offer two licenses, one to each downstream op-
erator. In this case, each of those firms faces a per unit input cost of rDA (where the
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superscript ‘D’ denotes that the upstream firm licenses to both operators and yields
downstream duopoly). Optimal prices and quantities are given by:
p1,vs =
−2− rDA (2 + γ) + γ(rDA + γ)
4 + γ2
; p2,vs =
γ − rDA (2 + γ) + a(−2 + γ2)
(−4 + γ2) ;
q1,vs =
2− γ(a+ γ) + rDA (−2 + γ + γ2)
(4− γ2)(1− γ2) ; q2,vs =
γ + a(−2 + γ2)− rDA (−2 + γ + γ2)
(4− γ2)(1− γ2) (4.A.4)
At the second stage, the upstream unit chooses rDA to maximize its own profit, πu,
where
πu = rDA (q1 + q2) = r
D
A (
1 + a− 2rDA
(2− γ)(1 + γ)
). (4.A.5)





and will make a profit equal to:
πu = −
(1 + a)2
8(−2 + γ)(1 + γ)
. (4.A.7)
Substituting for rDA in the stage 3 expressions, optimal downstream prices and profits
are given by:
p1,vs =
−2− 14 (1 + a)(2 + γ) + γ(a+ γ)
(−4 + γ2)
; p2,vs =




(6 + γ − 3γ2 + a(−2 + (−3 + γ)γ))2
16(−4 + γ2)2(−1 + γ2)
; π2,vs = −
(−2 + (−3 + γ)γ + a(6 + γ − 3γ2))2
16(−4 + γ2)2(−1 + γ2)
(4.A.8)
and consortium profit to the entity comprising the upstream patentee and the down-




8(2− γ)(1 + γ)
+
(6 + γ − 3γ2 + a(−2 + (−3 + γ)γ))2




Here, as in the previous subsection, duopoly is not always feasible. More pre-
cisely, firm 1 prices and output are only positive if the values of the goods are not
too different and the degree of substitutability between the downstream products is
sufficiently low. More precisely, firm 1 profits are positive only if 1 ≤ a < 3 and
γ ≤ γ̃3 = 12
(





. If either of these conditions does not hold,
firm 1 will shut its downstream unit and firm 2 operates as a monopolist.
The upstream unit will always offer a license to the entrant: no Anticommons arises.
But how does the consortium fare? If 1 ≤ a ≤ 2, the consortium does best if the
upstream unit sells to both downstream producers. If, however, a > 2, the consortium
does better to shut its downstream production unit and simply license to firm 2.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4.1
If the firm is vertically integrated, I have shown above that if (i) 1 ≤ a ≤ 1.01975,
firm 1 will refuse a license only if γ ∈ [γ1, γ2] or γ > γ̃1; or (ii) if 1.01975 < a ≤
√
2,
only if γ ∈ [γ1, γ2] or γ > γ̃2. If a >
√
2, the vertically integrated patentee will always
license, so no Anticommons results. But the firm will only operate downstream if (i)
a ∈ (
√
2, 1.45514], γ /∈ [γ3, γ4] and γ < γ̃2 or if (ii) a > 1.45514 and γ < γ̃2. If γ ≥ γ̃2,
a vertically integrated patentee will refuse to license and operate as a downstream
monopolist.
Consortium profit always exceeds π1,m but only exceeds vertically integrated payoff
when licensing (π1) if (i) 1 ≤ a ≤ 1.42933 or a ≥ 1.91809 and γ ∈ (γ̆1, γ̆2); or (ii)
1.42933 < a < 1.91809 and γ ∈ (γ̆3, γ̆4) where the critical values γ̆1, γ̆2, γ̆3, and γ̆4 are
the third, fourth, first and second roots, respectively, of the expression:
96− 64a+ 96a2 + (−32− 64a− 32a2)γ + (−220 + 104a− 188a2)γ2+
(60 + 56a+ 60a2)γ3 + (171− 34a+ 115a2)γ4 + (−32− 32a2)γ5+
(−48− 8a− 20a2)γ6 + (4 + 4a2)γ7 + (5 + 2a+ a2)γ8 (4.A.10)
The firm’s choice of corporate structure, and its licensing behaviour, for the permitted
range of γ therefore depends on the relative sizes of the key critical values γ1, γ2, γ̆1,
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γ̆2, γ̃1, γ̃2 and γ̃3:
• if a = 1, 0 < γ̆1 ≈ 0.629 < γ̃1 < 1 = γ̆2 = γ̃2 = γ̃3; the firm will remain vertically
integrated and license to the rival if γ ≤ γ̆1 and will vertically separate and sell
to both downstream producers if if 0.629 ≤ γ < 1;
• if a ∈ (1, 1.01975), 0 < γ̆1 < γ̃1 < γ̃3 < γ̆2 < 1; the firm will remain vertically
integrated and license to the rival if γ ≤ γ̆1; it will vertically separate with the
upstream unit selling to both downstream producers if γ̆1 < γ ≤ γ̃3; and it will
remain vertically integrated but block the rival if γ̃3 < γ < 1
• if a ∈ [1.01975, 1.30395), 0 < γ̆1 < γ1 < γ̃3 < γ2 < γ̃2 < γ̆2 < 1; the firm will
remain vertically integrated and license to the rival if γ ≤ γ̆1; it will vertically
separate with the upstream unit selling to both downstream producers if γ̆1 <
γ ≤ γ̃3; it will remain vertically integrated but block the rival if γ̃3 < γ ≤ γ2; it
will remain vertically integrated and license to the rival if γ2 < γ < γ̃2; and will
remain vertically integrated but block the rival if γ̃2 < γ < 1
• if a ∈ [1.30395,
√
2], 0 < γ̆1 < γ̃3 < γ1 < γ̃2 < γ2 < γ̆2 < 1; the firm will remain
vertically integrated and license to the rival if γ ≤ γ̆1; it will vertically separate
with the upstream unit selling to both downstream producers if γ̆1 < γ ≤ γ̃3; it
will remain vertically integrated and license to the rival if γ̃3 < γ ≤ γ1; it will
remain vertically integrated but block the rival if γ1 < γ ≤ γ2; it will remain
vertically integrated and license to the rival if γ2 < γ < γ̃2; and will remain
vertically integrated but block the rival if γ̃2 < γ < 1
To summarize, if the patentee can vertically separate, then
- if a = 1 it will never block the rival; Anticommons problems are eliminated.
- if a ∈ (1, 1.01975), the range over which the patentee will block is reduced from
[γ1, γ2] and γ̃1 < γ < 1 to only γ̃3 < γ < 1; Anticommons problems are less likely.
124
- if a ∈ [1.01975, 1.30395), the first range over which the patentee will block is re-
duced from [γ1, γ2] to only [γ̃3, γ2] (in this range, γ1 < γ̃3). The second range over
which the patentee will block the rival, γ̃2 < γ < 1, is not affected. Anticommons
problems are less likely.
- if a ≥ 1.30395, the patentee’s licensing behaviour does not change.
If a >
√
2, the firm will always license to the rival. In this range of parameters, γ̃3 < γ3
meaning that the firm will vertically separate and license to the rival if γ is low; it
will remain vertically integrated and licenses to the rival if γ ≤ γ̃1 and will vertically
separate otherwise, with licensing behaviour as described in Appendix 4.A.1 above.
in this case, the option of vertical separation does not change the patentee’s licensing
behaviour.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 4.3
In order to comment on the welfare effects of firm 1’s change in corporate structure, I
compare welfare with vertical integration to that with vertical separation, assuming in
each case that there is duopoly in the market. This yields the following:
• if 1 < a < 1.32323, welfare is higher under vertical separation only if γ > γ̇1
• if 1.32323 ≤ a ≤ 2, welfare is higher under vertical separation - that is (4.9) >
(4.8) - only if γ > γ̇2
where γ̇1 is the fifth root of the expression
(−1280− 2560a+ 1280a2 + (1024 + 1024a2)γ + (3200 + 6400a− 3584a2)γ2 + (−2240− 2240a2)γ3+
(−2980− 6472a+ 3868a2)γ4 + (1824 + 64a+ 1824a2)γ5 + (1359 + 3406a− 2073a2)γ6+
(−679− 102a− 679a2)γ7 + (−352− 980a+ 582a2)γ8 + (114 + 48a+ 114a2)γ9 + (55 + 142a
−79a2)γ10 + (−7− 6a− 7a2)γ11 + (−4− 8a+ 4a2)γ12
(4.A.11)
and γ̇2 is the seventh root of the expression given at (4.A.11).
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I then compare these critical substitutability thresholds to the threshold at which the
patentee firm elects to vertically separate. If the critical value at which firm 1 separates
is larger, then the change in corporate structure is welfare enhancing. Comparing, γ̆1 <
γ̇1∀a ∈ (1, 1.32323); but γ̆2 > γ̇2∀a ∈ (1.54874, 1.91809) and γ̆1 > γ̇2∀a ∈ (1.91809, 3).
Thus whenever the patentee chooses vertical separation, this choice is welfare enhancing
if 1.54874 < a < 3.
B. Appendix 2: The Model with Two Essential Patents
B.1. Proof of Remark 4.2
At stage 3, if there is downstream duopoly, the firms maximize π1 = (p1−rB)q1(p1, p2, γ)
and π2 = (p2 − rA − rB)q2(p1, p2, γ), respectively. Optimal prices and quantities are
given by
p1 =
−2− rB(2 + γ) + γ(a− 3rA + γ)
−4 + γ2
p2 =
−2(a+ rA + rB) + γ − rBγ + (a− rA)γ2
−4 + γ2 (4.B.1)
q1 =
2 + rB(−2 + γ + γ2)− γ(a+ rA + γ − rAγ2)
(4− γ2)(1− γ2)
q2 =
2a− 2(rA + rB) + (−1 + rB)γ + (−a+ 2rA + rB)γ2
(4− γ2)(1− γ2) . (4.B.2)
At stage 2, each patentee chooses its per-unit royalty taking its rival’s choice as given.
Firm 1, the insider, chooses A to maximize licensing revenue and downstream profits.
The firm’s total payoff max be expressed as:
rAq2 + (p1 − rB)q1 =
rA
(
(2a− 2(rA + rB) + (−1 + rB)γ + (−a+ 2rA + rB)γ2)




−2− rB(2 + γ) + γ(a− 3rA + γ)
−4 + γ2 − rB)(
2 + rB(−2 + γ + γ2)− γ(a+ rA + γ − rAγ2)
4− 5γ2 + γ4 )
)
(4.B.3)
while firm B chooses B to maximize licensing revenue, given by:
rB(q2 + q1) = rB((
2 + rB(−2 + γ + γ2)− γ(a+ rA + γ − rAγ2)
4− 5γ2 + γ4 )+
(
2a− 2(rA + rB) + (−1 + rB)γ + (−a+ 2rA + rB)γ2
4− 5γ2 + γ4 )) (4.B.4)
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The above yield the reaction functions, as follows:
rA =






Simultaneous solution of the foregoing yield expressions for the royalties in terms of
model parameters, given in (4.10). Given these royalties, downstream production is:
q1 =
20 + a(−4− 14γ − γ3 + γ4) + γ(2 + γ(−2 + γ − 3γ2))
(−1 + γ2)(−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2)))
(4.B.6)
q2 =
(2 + γ2)(2− (−5 + γ)γ + a(−3 + γ)(2 + γ))
(1− γ)(1 + γ)(−56 + γ(8 + γ(−8 + γ + γ2)))
(4.B.7)
Note that duopoly is only feasible if the downstream products are sufficiently different
and the market sizes are sufficiently close. Specifically, if (i) 1 ≤ a < 3 and γ ≤ γ̂1,
where γ̂1 corresponds to the second root of the expression(
20− 4a+ (2− 14a)γ − 2γ2 + (1− a)γ3 + (−3 + a)γ4
)
; or if (ii) a ≥ 3 and γ ≤ γ̂2, where
γ̂2 is the first root of the expression
(
20− 4a+ (2− 14a)γ − 2γ2 + (1− a)γ3 + (−3 + a)γ4
)
.
I next compare firm 1 profit under duopoly with that under monopoly. If 1 ≤ a < a∗,
the firm must decide if to refuse a license to firm 2 and operate as a monopolist, or offer
a license. It will always prefer to license to the rival if possible. If a ≥ a∗, firm 1 will
always license, but must decide whether to operate downstream. Again here it prefers
to operate so long as duopoly is feasible. Combining the foregoing, then, I conclude
that if 1 ≤ a < a∗, firm 1 will license if γ ≤ γ̂1 and refuse to license if γ > γ̂1; and if
a ≥ a∗, firm 1 will always license but will only operate downstream if γ ≤ min {γ̂1, γ̂2}.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 4.4
Given a, the patentee selects the profit maximizing corporate structure for the relevant
ranges: 0 ≤ γ < γ̂3, when it would license under both structures; for γ̂3 ≤ γ < γ̂1 when
it would license if integrated but license to a downstream monopolist if separated; and
for γ̂1 ≤ γ < 1 when would operate as a downstream monopolist if integrated but license
to a downstream monopolist if separated. Comparing its profit under the respective
corporate structures:
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• if a ∈ [1, a∗2), the firm will vertically separate and license to downstream duopolists
if γ ≤ γ̃4; remain vertically integrated and license to the rival if γ̃4 < γ ≤ γ∗2 and
will vertically separate operate as a downstream monopolist if γ∗2 < γ ≤ 1
• if a ∈ [a∗2, 173(50 + 21
√
6)), the firm will vertically separate and license to down-
stream duopolists if γ ≤ γ̃4; remain vertically integrated and license to the rival
if γ̃4 < γ ≤ γ∗2 and will shut its downstream production, licensing only to the
downstream rival if γ∗2 < γ ≤ 1 where γ̃4 is the first root of J ;
• if a ∈ [ 173(50 + 21
√
6), 3), the firm will remain vertically integrated and license to
the rival if γ ≤ γ∗2 and will shut its downstream production, licensing only to the
downstream rival if γ∗2 < γ ≤ 1;
• if a ≥ 3, the firm will shut its downstream operation and license to firm 2 for all
0 ≤ γ ≤ 1.
where γ̃4 is the first root the following expression:
−1024− 51200a+ 37376a2 + (−2816− 7168a+ 32512a2)γ + (−6272 + 3584a− 9728a2)γ2 + (3392− 3200a
−4288a2)γ3 + (416 + 15808a− 6496a2)γ4 + (32− 2432a+ 1856a2)γ5 + (−688− 32a+ 296a2)γ6
+(700− 880a+ 436a2)γ7 + (−228 + 84a− 66a2)γ8 + (−21 + 78a− 63a2)γ9 + (20 + 4a+ 2a2)
γ10 + (9− 6a+ 3a2)γ11.
(4.B.8)
Note that when the patentee shuts downstream production and simply licenses to the
rival, it is indifferent to the corporate structure.
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